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JUXTAPOSITION: A NEW WAY TO COMBINE LOGICS
JOSHUA B. SCHECHTER
Abstract. This paper develops a new framework for combining propositional logics,
called “juxtaposition”. Several general metalogical theorems are proved concerning the
combination of logics by juxtaposition. In particular, it is shown that under reasonable
conditions, juxtaposition preserves strong soundness. Under reasonable conditions, the
juxtaposition of two consequence relations is a conservative extension of each of them. A
general strong completeness result is proved. The paper then examines the philosophically
important case of the combination of classical and intuitionist logics. Particular attention
is paid to the phenomenon of collapse. It is shown that there are logics with two stocks
of classical or intuitionist connectives that do not collapse. Finally, the paper briefly
investigates the question of which rules, when added to these logics, lead to collapse.
§1. Introduction. Methods of combining logics are of great interest.1 For-
mal systems that result from the combination of multiple logical systems into a
single system have applications in mathematics, linguistics, and computer sci-
ence. For example, there are many applications for logics with multiple kinds of
modal operators – epistemic, temporal, and deontic.
There are also purely philosophical reasons to be interested in the combination
of logics. One illustration of this comes from so-called collapse theorems.
Suppose there is a language with two stocks of the usual logical connectives (for
propositional or for first-order logic) – ∧1 and ∧2, ∨1 and ∨2, and so on. There
is a well-known result which states that given any logic for this language such
that each logical constant obeys the usual natural deduction rules (for classical
or even for intuitionist logic), sentences that differ only in some or all of their
subscripts are intersubstitutable.2 Corresponding connectives, such as ∧1 and
∧2, behave as mere notational variants. In such a logic, if one stock of constants
obeys the classical natural deduction rules, so does the other.
This result has been used to argue for several striking philosophical theses.
For instance, it has been used to argue that the logical constants in our language
This is the penultimate draft of a paper that appears in The Review of Symbolic Logic
(2011) 4(4): 560–606
1Methods of combining logics include fibring and its variants, as developed by Gabbay, as
well as algebraic fibring and its variants, as developed by A. Sernadas and his collaborators.
See Gabbay (1998) and Carnielli et al. (2008), respectively, for comprehensive overviews of
this work. See Caleiro et al. (2005) for a summary of the central results concerning algebraic
fibring.
2See McGee (2000) for proof of this result. See Harris (1982) for a closely related result.
The first collapse results of which I am aware appear in Carnap (1943), sections A.7–A.9. Also
see Popper (1948) for the collapse of classical and intuitionist logic.
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have unique and determinate extensions. The argument goes as follows: Sup-
pose that one of our logical constants had an indeterminate extension. Then we
could precisify the term. We could introduce two (or more) precise terms into
our language with distinct extensions. These terms would presumably obey the
usual natural deduction rules (understood to apply to the expanded language).
But since the terms would have distinct extensions, they would not be intersub-
stitutable. By the collapse result, however, this is impossible. Therefore, the
logical constants in our language must not be indeterminate.
Vann McGee makes use of a related line of thought to argue for striking claims
about quantification.3 He argues that there is a unique determinate domain for
the unrestricted universal quantifier. On his view, when metaphysicians intend
to be talking about absolutely everything, they succeed in so doing. Disputes in
ontology are genuine disputes; when metaphysicians disagree about what exists,
they are not simply talking past each other by using “exists” in different ways.
Timothy Williamson uses the collapse result to argue for a claim about the
relationship between classical and intuitionist logic.4 He claims that the collapse
result demonstrates that there cannot be two stocks of logical constants – one
classical and one intuitionist – with distinct extensions. The classicist and the
intuitionist cannot both be right. Either intuitionism is correct and classical
logic is incoherent, or (as Williamson suggests) classical logic is correct and the
intuitionists fail to recognize certain genuinely valid entailments.5
There are several ways in which the philosophical arguments for these conclu-
sions may be challenged, and there has been some discussion of these issues in
the literature.6 What has not received sufficient attention, however, is the tech-
nical situation. It turns out that the technical situation is not as straightforward
as has usually been supposed. For example, there are logics with two stocks
of connectives that each obey the usual classical theorems and entailments (for
the entire language), but in which corresponding constants are not intersubsti-
tutable. There are logics with two stocks of connectives, one obeying the classical
theorems and entailments and the other obeying the intuitionist theorems and
entailments, but in which corresponding constants are not intersubstitutable.7
The caveat to these results is that the connectives do not obey the usual natural
3See McGee (2000).
4See Williamson (1987). A similar line of thought is present in Harris (1982). See Hand
(1993) for relevant discussion.
5Analogous results have also been used to argue for striking philosophical claims about
mathematical concepts. For instance, the categoricity of second-order arithmetic – a sort of
collapse theorem – has been used to argue that “finite” has a unique determinate extension.
The quasi-categoricity of second-order ZF set theory has been used to argue for the claim that
we have a unique determinate conception of the sets, at least up to height. See McGee (1997),
Parsons (1990), and Shapiro (1991) for discussion.
6See, for example, the postscript to Field (2001).
7This result can also be proved using the technique of crypto-fibring. In particular, see
Caleiro & Ramos (2007) for proof of this result restricted to the implicational fragments of
classical and intuitionist logic. The technique of modulated fibring, as described in Sernadas
et al. (2002), also provides a way to combine classical and intuitionist logics without collapse.
However, the resulting logic is not substitution invariant. Also see del Cerro & Herzig (1996)
for a non-substitution invariant logic that combines classical and intuitionist logics.
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deduction meta-rules in their full generality.8 The natural deduction rules en-
code more logical strength than one might have expected. Perhaps surprisingly,
the collapse results rely on this extra strength. Thus, the collapse results turn
out to be very fragile. Indeed, the issue of when exactly logics collapse turns out
to be rather delicate.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, I develop a new framework for
combining logical systems, called “juxtaposition”. I prove general metalogical
results concerning the combination of logics by juxtaposition. Second, I examine
the particular case of combining classical and intuitionist logics. I show how
the general results can be applied to shed light on the phenomenon of collapse.
I demonstrate that the collapse results are much more limited than one might
have expected.
The paper will proceed as follows. In the next section, I introduce the gen-
eral logical apparatus that will be employed. In this paper, I focus on the case
of propositional logics. The approach to semantics employed here is broadly
algebraic. I consider two semantic frameworks. The first involves sets of logi-
cal matrices, algebras with an arbitrary set of designated values. The second,
more interesting, framework involves sets of unital matrices, algebras with a
single designated value.9 In section three, I present the main constructions for
combining (“juxtaposing”) logical systems. Juxtaposing consequence relations
is straightforward – the juxtaposition of two consequence relations is the least
consequence relation that extends the original consequence relations. (In this
paper, consequence relations are required to obey the usual structural rules and
to be substitution invariant.) The juxtaposition of two algebraic structures is
only slightly more complicated. A juxtaposed model is an ordered pair of mod-
els, each of which is based on the respective algebraic structure. There are two
modifications to this basic idea that are needed to get the semantics to work.
First, each of the two models must provide semantic values for sentences of the
entire language. Therefore, each model treats sentences with main connectives
governed by the other logic as though they were additional sentence symbols.
Second, the two models must agree on which sentences get assigned designated
values. In this way, juxtaposed models must be “coherent”.
In section four, I compare juxtaposition to two other methods of combining
logics – algebraic fibring and modulated fibring. Section five is devoted to pre-
senting basic metalogical results concerning juxtaposition. In particular, I show
that under reasonable conditions, juxtaposition preserves strong soundness. I
show that under reasonable conditions, juxtaposition preserves consistency. I
also show that under reasonable conditions, the juxtaposition of two consequence
relations is a strong conservative extension of the original relations. In section
six, I turn to strong completeness. In this section, I present direct proofs of
8A meta-rule is a rule that governs relations among entailments but do not themselves state
entailments. Conditional Introduction, Reasoning by Cases, and Classical Reductio are meta-
rules. Conjunction Introduction and Elimination, Disjunction Elimination, Modus Ponens,
and Double Negation Elimination are not meta-rules in this sense.
9There are other natural approaches to algebraic semantics. For example, we could make
use of classes of logical matrices where the designated values can be characterized by a set of
equations. See Blok & Pigozzi (1989).
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strong completeness that apply in a wide range of cases. Indeed, I provide nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for the case where the two stocks of connectives
are disjoint. Finally, in section seven, I turn to the philosophically important
case of combining classical and intuitionist logics. Applying the general met-
alogical results, I show that a logic with two stocks of classical connectives is
consistent, conservative, and strongly sound and strongly complete with respect
to a particular class of juxtaposed structures – the “bi-Boolean” structures. I
show that a logic with two stocks of intuitionist connectives is consistent, con-
servative, and strongly sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of
“bi-Heyting” structures.10 A logic with one stock of intuitionist connectives and
one stock of classical connectives is consistent, conservative, and strongly sound
and strongly complete with respect to the class of “Heyting-Boolean” structures.
I prove that none of these logics collapse. I also investigate the question of which
rules (and meta-rules) lead to collapse when added to these logics.
§2. Basic Notions.
2.1. Syntax. A language for propositional logic can be specified by a signa-
ture and a set of sentence symbols. A signature C = {Cn}n∈N is an indexed
family of sets over the natural numbers.11 For each n ∈ N, Cn is the (possibly
empty) set of connectives of arity n. A set of sentence symbols, P , is a non-empty
set. For convenience, we only work with infinite sets of sentence symbols. To
avoid ambiguity, we assume that the elements of each Cn and P are not them-
selves sequences. We also assume that Cm and Cn are disjoint if m 6= n and
that each Cn is disjoint with P .
Suppose C and C ′ are two signatures. We say that C and C ′ are disjoint just
in case for each n ∈ N, Cn and C ′n are disjoint. Otherwise, we say that C and
C ′ overlap. We say that C ′ is a sub-signature of C just in case for each n ∈ N,
C ′n ⊆ Cn.
Given a signature C and a set of sentence symbols P , the set of sentences
generated by C and P , Sent(C,P ), is inductively defined to be the least set such
that:
• If α ∈ P then α ∈ Sent(C,P );
• If c ∈ Cn and α1, . . . , αn ∈ Sent(C,P ) then cα1 . . . αn ∈ Sent(C,P ).
We write α, β, γ, and δ (sometimes with superscripts) to stand for sentences.12
We write Γ and ∆ to stand for sets of sentences. We write p, q, and r to stand
for sentence symbols.
We write α[β/p] to stand for the result of uniformly substituting each occur-
rence of p in α with β. We write Γ[β/p] to stand for the set {γ[β/p] | γ ∈ Γ}.
Let σ be any function from a subset of P to some set. We write ασ to stand for
the result of uniformly substituting each occurrence of any p in the domain of σ
in α with σ(p). We write Γσ to stand for the set {γσ | γ ∈ Γ}.
10This is a different usage of “bi-Heyting” than the one familiar from Skolem.
11In this paper, superscripts are used as indices and not as exponents.
12Following standard practice, we don’t conform to strict conventions governing use and
mention when there is little danger of confusion.
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For ease of comprehension, when displaying sentences in the language of clas-
sical propositional logic, we use infix rather than prefix notation.
2.2. Consequence Relations. A consequence relation, `, for a set of sen-
tences Sent(C,P ) is a relation holding between subsets of Sent(C,P ) and ele-
ments of Sent(C,P ) such that the following conditions obtain for every α, β, Γ,
∆, and p:
Identity. {α} ` α;
Weakening. If Γ ` α then Γ ∪∆ ` α;
Cut. If Γ ` α and ∆ ∪ {α} ` β then Γ ∪∆ ` β;
Uniform Substitution. If Γ ` α then Γ[β/p] ` α[β/p].13
In this paper, we do not require that consequence relations be compact. That
is, it need not be the case that if Γ ` α then there is a finite ∆ ⊆ Γ such that
∆ ` α.
Suppose C− is a sub-signature of C and P− is a subset of P . Suppose `−
is a consequence relation for Sent(C−, P−) and ` is a consequence relation for
Sent(C,P ). We say that ` extends `− just in case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C−, P−)
and α ∈ Sent(C−, P−), if Γ `− α then Γ ` α. We say that ` is a strong
conservative extension of `− just in case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C−, P−) and α ∈
Sent(C−, P−), Γ `− α just in case Γ ` α.
Let ` be a consequence relation for Sent(C,P ). We say that α is deducible
from Γ just in case Γ ` α. We say that α is a theorem of ` just in case ∅ ` α.
As usual, we write ` α for ∅ ` α.
We say that Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ) is consistent with respect to ` just in case there
is an α ∈ Sent(C,P ) such that Γ 0 α.14 We say that ` is consistent just in
case there is an α ∈ Sent(C,P ) such that 0 α. We say that ` is non-trivial just
in case there is a non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ) and an α ∈ Sent(C,P ) such that
Γ 0 α. We say that ` has no mere followers just in case ` α whenever Γ ` α
for every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ).15 We say that ` has theorems just in case
there is at least one theorem of `. These notions are related as follows: Any
consequence relation that has theorems has no mere followers. Any consistent
consequence relation that has no mere followers is non-trivial. Any non-trivial
consequence relation is consistent.
2.3. Semantics. The approach to semantics we employ is broadly algebraic.
A structure over a signature C is an ordered triple B = 〈B,D,Φ〉 such that B
is the carrier set of the structure, D is a non-empty proper subset of B, and for
every c ∈ Cn, Φ(c) is a function from the n-th Cartesian power of B to B. B is
the set of semantic values of B. D is the set of designated values of B. Φ is the
denotation function of B. Since D is a non-empty proper subset of B, B must
have at least two elements. If D has only a single element, we say that B is a
unital structure and we write 1 to stand for the single designated value.
13A consequence relation is thus required to be structural in the sense of  Loś & Suszko
(1958).
14Consistency is defined here as non-explosion. In a paraconsistent logic, a consistent set
may contain both a sentence and its negation.
15I borrow the term “no mere followers” from Humberstone (2011), pages 459–460.
6 JOSHUA B. SCHECHTER
Given a structure B = 〈B,D,Φ〉 and a set of sentence symbols P , a valuation
for B and P is a function from P to B.
A model over a signature C and a set of sentence symbols P is an ordered
pair M = 〈B, V 〉 such that B is a structure over C, and V is a valuation for B
and P . We say that the model M is based on the structure B. Given a class
of structures B over C, we say that M is based on B just in case M is based
on some element of B. If M is based on a unital structure, we call M a unital
model.
Suppose M = 〈B, V 〉 is a model over C and P based on B = 〈B,D,Φ〉. For
any α ∈ Sent(C,P ), the value of α inM, ‖α‖M, is recursively defined as follows:
• ‖α‖M = V (α) if α ∈ P ;
• ‖cα1 . . . αn‖M = Φ(c)(‖α1‖M, . . . , ‖αn‖M) if c ∈ Cn and α1, . . . , αn ∈
Sent(C,P ).
Given a model M, we write M  α to mean that α has a designated value
in M. For short, we say that M designates the sentence α. This obtains just
in case ‖α‖M ∈ D. We write M  Γ to mean that M designates each of the
sentences in Γ. This obtains just in case for every γ ∈ Γ, M  γ.
If a model M over C and P either designates every element of Sent(C,P ) or
designates no element of Sent(C,P ), we say that M is trivial. Otherwise, we
say that M is non-trivial. For any structure B over C and any set of sentence
symbols P , there is a non-trivial model over C and P based on B.
Given a class of structures B over C, we write B α to mean that α is valid
in B. This obtains just in case for every model M over C and P based on B,
M  α. We write Γ B α to mean that Γ entails α in B. This obtains just in
case, for every model M over C and P based on B, if M  Γ then M  α.16
2.4. Soundness and Completeness. Given a consequence relation ` for
the set of sentences Sent(C,P ) and a class of structures B over C, we say that
` is strongly sound with respect to B just in case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ) and
α ∈ Sent(C,P ), if Γ ` α then Γ B α. We say that ` is strongly complete with
respect to B just in case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ) and α ∈ Sent(C,P ), if Γ B α
then Γ ` α. We say that ` is strongly determined with respect to B just in case
for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ) and α ∈ Sent(C,P ), Γ B α just in case Γ ` α.
We say that ` is strongly sound, strongly complete, or strongly determined
(simpliciter) just in case ` is strongly sound, strongly complete, or strongly
determined (respectively) with respect to some non-empty class of structures.
We say that ` is strongly unital sound, strongly unital complete, or strongly unital
determined (simpliciter) just in case ` is strongly sound, strongly complete, or
strongly determined (respectively) with respect to some non-empty class of unital
structures.
16Strictly speaking, these definitions require P to be fixed by context. However, whether
α is valid in B does not depend on P so long as P contains all of the sentence symbols that
occur in α. Similarly, whether Γ entails α in B does not depend on P so long as P contains all
of the sentence symbols that occur in Γ and α.
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2.5. Known Results. Let ` be a consequence relation for Sent(C,P ). We
say that ` is left-extensional just in case for every α, β, δ ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p
occurring in δ, {α, β, δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p].17 The following results are known:
Theorem 2.1. ` is strongly determined just in case ` is consistent and has
no mere followers.18
Theorem 2.2. ` is strongly unital determined just in case ` is consistent,
has no mere followers, and is left-extensional.19
§3. Juxtaposition. We consider here the case of combining two logics. It is
straightforward to extend the construction to combinations of arbitrarily many
logics (indexed by some set). In what follows, we sometimes use i to range over
{1, 2}.
3.1. Syntax. Let C1 and C2 be two signatures and P1 and P2 be two sets of
sentence symbols. (Recall that P1 and P2 are required to be infinite.) We allow
P1 and P2 to overlap. We also allow C1 and C2 to overlap.
20 For simplicity, we
assume that Cm1 and C
n
2 are disjoint if m 6= n. We also assume that each Cni is
disjoint with each of P1 and P2.
The juxtaposition of the sets of sentence symbols P1 and P2, P12, is P1 ∪ P2.
The juxtaposition of the signatures C1 and C2, C12, is {Cn1 ∪ Cn2 }n∈N. That
is, C12 is the signature that results from taking the union of each of the sets
of connectives of arity n.21 The set of sentences generated by C12 and P12,
Sent(C12, P12), is defined just as above.
22
3.2. Consequence Relations. Let `1 be a consequence relation for
Sent(C1, P1) and let `2 be a consequence relation for Sent(C2, P2). A juxtaposed
consequence relation over `1 and `2 is a consequence relation for Sent(C12, P12)
that extends both `1 and `2.
It is immediate that if `1 or `2 is non-empty, so is any juxtaposed consequence
relation over `1 and `2. If `1 or `2 has theorems, so does any juxtaposed
consequence relation over `1 and `2. Using Uniform Substitution it is easy to
show that if `1 or `2 is inconsistent, so is any juxtaposed consequence relation
over `1 and `2. Similarly, if `1 or `2 is trivial, so is any juxtaposed consequence
relation over `1 and `2.
17Wójcicki (1988), page 236, calls this property “strong replacement”. I borrow the term
“left-extensional” from Humberstone (2011), section 3.23, who uses it for a slightly different
property.
18See, for example, Observation 3.23.13 in Humberstone (2011). The core of this result is
Theorem 3.1.5 in Wójcicki (1988). It is originally due to Lindenbaum.
19See, for example, Theorem 3.23.9 in Humberstone (2011). The core of this result is
Theorem II.1.2 in Czelakowski (1981). It is originally due to Suszko.
20In the literature on fibring, the combination of logics with overlapping signatures is referred
to as “constrained” and the combination of logics with disjoint signatures is referred to as
“unconstrained”.
21This is essentially the same construction as the categorial fibring of propositional signa-
tures, as described in Sernadas et al. (1999), page 152.
22There is an alternative choice we could have made here. We could have defined
Sent(C12, P12) to disallow sentences with connectives from both signatures. But that would
have yielded a much less interesting language.
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The juxtaposition of the consequence relations `1 and `2 is the intersection of
all juxtaposed consequence relations over `1 and `2. It is routine to show that
the juxtaposition of `1 and `2 is a juxtaposed consequence relation over `1 and
`2.23
3.3. Semantics. In developing a semantics for juxtaposed consequence re-
lations, one might think that we should base our semantics on classes of unital
structures (or classes of structures, more generally) just as above. However, this
is not the best approach to take. By Theorem 2.2, a consequence relation is
strongly determined with respect to a non-empty class of unital structures only
if it is left-extensional. But the juxtaposition of two left-extensional consequence
relations need not be left-extensional. Indeed, as we will see below, although the
classical consequence relation is left-extensional, the juxtaposition of two copies
of the classical consequence relation is not. So, if we would like a strong unital de-
termination result for this consequence relation, we must rely upon a somewhat
different semantics.
A juxtaposed structure over the signatures C1 and C2 is an ordered pair 〈B1,B2〉
such that each Bi is a structure over Ci. If Bi is a unital structure, we write 1i
to stand for the designated value of Bi. If B1 and B2 are unital structures, we
say that 〈B1,B2〉 is a juxtaposed unital structure.
Suppose B1 is a structure over C1 and B2 is a structure over C2. Then the
juxtaposition of the structures B1 and B2 is the ordered pair 〈B1,B2〉. Suppose
B1 is a class of structures over C1 and B2 is a class of structures over C2. Then
the juxtaposition of the classes of structures B1 and B2 is the Cartesian product
B1 × B2.
The set of i-atoms contains the elements of Sent(C12, P12) that do not have a
main connective from Ci. For example, if C1 and C2 are disjoint then the 1-atoms
include the elements of P12 as well as those sentences with a main connective
from C2. If C1 and C2 overlap then the 1-atoms include the elements of P12 as
well as those sentences with a main connective from C2 but not from C1.
A juxtaposed model over the signatures C1 and C2 and the set of sentence
symbols P12 is an ordered quadruple 〈B1, V1,B2, V2〉 such that 〈B1,B2〉 is a jux-
taposed structure over C1 and C2, and each Vi is a function from the set of
i-atoms of Sent(C12, P12) to Bi. In effect, a juxtaposed model is a pair of mod-
els, each of which treats sentences with main connectives not from its signature
as if they were additional sentence symbols.
We say that the juxtaposed model 〈B1, V1,B2, V2〉 is based on the juxtaposed
structure 〈B1,B2〉. More generally, we say that a juxtaposed modelM12 is based
on the class of juxtaposed structures B12 just in caseM12 is based on one of the
elements of B12. If M12 is based on a juxtaposed unital structure, we say that
M12 is a juxtaposed unital model.
23Cruz-Filipe et al. (2007) defines a more general notion of the fibring of consequence re-
lations that also applies in the case of non-substitution invariant consequence relations. By
Propositions 2.18 and 2.19 in that paper, the fibring of two substitution invariant consequence
relations coincides with their juxtaposition.
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Suppose M12 = 〈B1, V1,B2, V2〉 is a juxtaposed model over C1, C2, and P12,
where each Bi = 〈Bi, Di,Φi〉. For any α ∈ Sent(C12, P12), the i-value of α in
M12, ‖α‖M12i , is recursively defined as follows:
• ‖α‖M12i = Vi(α) if α is an i-atom;
• ‖cα1 . . . αn‖M12i = Φi(c)(‖α1‖
M12
i . . . ‖αn‖
M12
i ) if c ∈ Cni and α1, . . . , αn ∈
Sent(C12, P12).
We sometimes omit the M12 if the relevant juxtaposed model is clear from
context.
We say that a juxtaposed model is coherent just in case for every sentence
α ∈ Sent(C12, P12), ‖α‖M121 ∈ D1 just in case ‖α‖
M12
2 ∈ D2. In other words, α
has a designated 1-value just in case it has a designated 2-value. The notion of
coherence is needed to provide a sensible definition of designation for juxtaposed
models.
Given a coherent juxtaposed model M12, we write M12  α to mean that
M12 designates the sentence α. This obtains just in case ‖α‖M121 ∈ D1 (or
equivalently, ‖α‖M122 ∈ D2). We write M12  Γ to mean that M12 designates
each of the sentences in Γ. This obtains just in case for every γ ∈ Γ, M12  γ.
If a coherent juxtaposed model M12 over C1, C2, and P12 either designates
every element of Sent(C12, P12) or designates no element of Sent(C12, P12), we
say that M12 is trivial. Otherwise, we say that M12 is non-trivial. We show
below (Proposition 5.2) that if C1 and C2 are disjoint then for any structure B12
over C1, C2, and any set of sentence symbols P12, there is a coherent non-trivial
juxtaposed model over C1, C2, and P12 based on B12.
Given a class of juxtaposed structures B12 over C1 and C2, we write B12 α
to mean that α is valid in B12. This obtains just in case for every coherent
juxtaposed model M12 over C1, C2, and P12 based on B12, M12  α. We write
Γ B12 α to mean that Γ entails α in B12. This obtains just in case, for every
coherent juxtaposed modelM12 over C1, C2, and P12 based on B12, ifM12  Γ
then M12  α.24
Notice that this semantics is philosophically very natural. The two models
in a coherent juxtaposed model can be thought of as representing speakers of
different languages who take on board one another’s claims without interpreting
them in their home languages.
3.4. Soundness and Completeness. Suppose `12 is a consequence relation
for Sent(C12, P12), and B12 is a class of juxtaposed structures over C1 and C2.
We say that `12 is strongly sound with respect to B12 just in case for every
Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) and α ∈ Sent(C12, P12), if Γ `12 α then Γ B12 α. We
say that `12 is strongly complete with respect to B12 just in case for every
Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) and α ∈ Sent(C12, P12), if Γ B12 α then Γ `12 α. We
say that `12 is strongly determined with respect to B12 just in case for every
Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) and α ∈ Sent(C12, P12), Γ B12 α just in case Γ `12 α.
24As before, the relevant set of sentence symbols is fixed by context.
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We say that `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly sound, 〈C1, C2〉-strongly complete, or
〈C1, C2〉-strongly determined just in case `12 is strongly sound, strongly com-
plete, or strongly determined (respectively) with respect to some class of jux-
taposed structures over C1 and C2 that has a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed
model based on it. We say that `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital sound, 〈C1, C2〉-
strongly unital complete, or 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital determined just in case `12
is strongly sound, strongly complete, or strongly determined (respectively) with
respect to some class of juxtaposed unital structures over C1 and C2 that has a
coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model based on it.25
§4. Algebraic Fibring and Modulated Fibring. To better understand
juxtaposition, it may be helpful to compare it with other methods of combin-
ing logics. In this section, I briefly compare juxtaposition with two other such
methods – algebraic fibring and modulated fibring.26
The algebraic fibring of two consequence relations is essentially the same as
their juxtaposition. The sole difference is that algebraic fibring is applied to
Hilbert calculi, which correspond to compact consequence relations. The impor-
tant differences arise in the semantics.
The semantics for algebraic fibring makes use of partially ordered unital ma-
trices. In the notation of this paper, a partially ordered unital structure is a
quadruple 〈B,≤, {1},Φ〉 where 〈B, {1},Φ〉 is a unital structure and ≤ is a par-
tial order on B with the top element 1. The purpose of the partial ordering is to
enable one to define two notions of entailment. Given a class of partially ordered
unital structures, B, Γ globally entails α in B just in case in every model based
on B, if each element of Γ is designated, then so is α. By contrast, Γ locally
entails α just in case in every model based on B, the value of each element of Γ
is less than or equal to the value of α. For simplicity, however, in what follows,
we’ll focus on global entailment.
Suppose B = 〈B,≤, {1},Φ〉 is a partially ordered unital structure over C.
Suppose C ′ is a sub-signature of C. The reduct of B to C ′ is B|C′ = 〈B,≤
, {1},Φ|C′〉, where Φ|C′ is the restriction of Φ to the connectives from C ′. Let B1
be a class of partially ordered unital structures over C1 and let B2 be a class of
partially ordered unital structures over C2. The algebraic fibring of B1 and B2 is
B12 = {B | B|C1 ∈ B1 and B|C2 ∈ B2}. This is a very natural construction. The
algebraic fibring of two classes of partially ordered unital structures is simply a
class of partially ordered unital structures. This is unlike the case of juxtaposition
– the juxtaposition of two classes of unital structures is a class of pairs of unital
structures.
One weakness of algebraic fibring compared to juxtaposition is that the strong
determination theorem is weaker. Consider the following principle:
25In the case where C1 and C2 are disjoint, Proposition 5.2 enables us to simplify these def-
initions: `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly sound, 〈C1, C2〉-strongly complete, or 〈C1, C2〉-strongly de-
termined just in case `12 is strongly sound, strongly complete, or strongly determined (respec-
tively) with respect to some non-empty class of juxtaposed structures over C1 and C2. (And
similarly for the cases of 〈C1, C2〉-strong unital soundness, completeness, and determination.)
26See Carnielli et al. (2008) for a comprehensive overview of these two methods.
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Entailment Congruence. If Γ ∪ {α} ` β and Γ ∪ {β} ` α then for any
δ ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p occurring in δ, Γ ∪ {δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p].27
(This is a significant strengthening of left-extensionality.) The strong determina-
tion result for algebraic fibring relies upon the following basic result: Any conse-
quence relation that has theorems and obeys Entailment Congruence is strongly
determined with respect to some class of partially ordered unital structures.28
We say that a consequence relation ` over Sent(C,P ) has implication → just
in case →∈ C2 and ` obeys Modus Ponens and Conditional Introduction with
respect to→. Given a consequence relation ` that has implication→, we say that
` has equivalence ↔ just in case ↔∈ C2 and ` obeys the following rules: {α↔
β} ` α → β; {α ↔ β} ` β → α; {α → β, β → α} ` α ↔ β; and {α ↔ β} `
δ[α/p]↔ δ[β/p]. The point of these definitions is that any consequence relation
that has implication and equivalence obeys Entailment Congruence. Moreover,
if two compact consequence relations each have the very same implication and
equivalence then the algebraic fibring of the two consequence relations will have
implication and equivalence, too.
The strong determination result for algebraic fibring is as follows: Suppose `1
and `2 are compact consequence relations that have the very same implication
and equivalence. Suppose `12 is the algebraic fibring of `1 and `2. Then `12
is strongly determined with respect to some class of partially ordered unital
structures. In particular, `12 is strongly determined with respect to the algebraic
fibring of the class of all partially ordered unital structures for `1 and the class
of all partially ordered unital structures for `2.29
This result is significantly weaker than our strong unital determination result
below. By Corollary 6.30, if two consequence relations are each consistent and
left-extensional and at least one of them has theorems, then their juxtaposition is
strongly unital determined. The two consequence relations need not be compact.
They need not have overlapping signatures. They need not have implication
or equivalence. Indeed, for the result to apply, the juxtaposition of the two
consequence relations need not obey Entailment Congruence.
A related issue is that algebraic fibring is not suitable to use in studying the
collapse of classical and intuitionist logics.30 One way to see the problem is in
terms of the semantics. The classical consequence relation is strongly determined
with respect to the class of all partially ordered unital structures in which the
partial ordering corresponds to a Boolean algebra. The intuitionist consequence
relation is strongly determined with respect to the class of all partially ordered
unital structures in which the partial ordering corresponds to a Heyting algebra.
The algebraic fibring of these two classes of partially ordered unital structures
is a class of partially ordered unital structures in which the relevant reducts are
27This property is called “congruentiality” in Rautenberg (1981). Consequence relations
obeying Entailment Congruence are called “Fregean” in Czelakowski & Pigozzi (2004) and
“weakly extensional” in Humberstone (2011), pages 455-456.
28See Theorem 5.7 in Zanardo et al. (2001) and Theorem 3.3.15 in Carnielli et al. (2008)
for a closely related but somewhat more complicated result.
29See Theorem 6.7 in Zanardo et al. (2001) and Theorem 3.3.18 in Carnielli et al. (2008).
30This is well-known in the literature on fibring and algebraic fibring. See, for instance,
Gabbay (1998), page 8.
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both Boolean and Heyting algebras. But these must all be Boolean algebras.
Thus, the resulting logic ends up behaving purely classically for both stocks
of connectives. Indeed, we can show that corresponding connectives become
intersubstitutable. The logic collapses.
There is a second way to see the problem. Suppose we have a language with two
of each of the usual logical connectives. Suppose `ii is the consequence relation
for this language that obeys all of the intuitionist theorems and entailments
for each stock of connectives. As we will see below, any consequence relation
that extends `ii and obeys Entailment Congruence collapses. But the proof of
the strong determination result for algebraic fibring crucially depends on the
combined logic obeying Entailment Congruence. So there is no way to avoid
collapse.
There are methods of combining logics designed to avoid collapse.31 Perhaps
the most well worked out is modulated fibring.32 The method of combining
consequence relations and the method of combining classes of structures are
significantly more complicated for modulated fibring than for algebraic fibring or
for juxtaposition. But the basic idea is straightforward. A modulated structure
is a quadruple 〈B,≤, {1},Φ〉 such that 〈B, {1},Φ〉 is a structure and ≤ is a
pre-order with finite meets and top element 1. Each modulated structure B12
in the modulated fibring B12 of two classes of modulated structures B1 and B2
corresponds to a pair (or pairs) of modulated structures 〈B1,B2〉, where B1 ∈ B1
and B2 ∈ B2. The semantic values of B12 are the union of the semantic values
of the original two structures. To get the construction to work, however, a
restriction has to be imposed on which pairs of modulated structures yield a
modulated structure in B12. In particular, there must be translations between
the semantic values of B1 and the semantic values of B2. These translations are
established by something called a bridge, which is provided as an input to the
modulated fibring procedure.
The proof theory for modulated fibring relies on a variant of Hilbert calculi
called modulated Hilbert calculi. The strong determination result for algebraic
fibring relies upon the fact that any modulated Hilbert calculus that has the-
orems and obeys Entailment Congruence is strongly determined with respect
to some class of modulated structures.33 The strong determination result for
modulated fibring is as follows: The modulated fibring (by an adequate bridge)
of two modulated Hilbert calculi that each have theorems and obey Entailment
Congruence is strongly determined with respect to a class of modulated struc-
tures. In particular, it is strongly determined with respect to the modulated
fibring (by the bridge) of the class of all modulated structures in which `1 is
sound and the class of modulated structures in which `2 is sound.34 Moreover,
a sufficient condition for there being an adequate bridge is that the two conse-
quence relations are for disjoint languages.35 So there is a strong determination
31See, for instance, crypto-fibring as defined in Caleiro & Ramos (2007).
32See Sernadas et al. (2002). Also see Carnielli et al. (2008), chapter 8.
33See Theorem 5.6 in Sernadas et al. (2002) and Theorem 8.5.10 in Carnielli et al. (2008)
for a closely related result.
34See Theorem 5.12 in Sernadas et al. (2002) and Theorem 8.5.16 in Carnielli et al. (2008).
35See Example 5.13 in Sernadas et al. (2002) and Example 8.5.17 in Carnielli et al. (2008).
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result for any pair of modulated Hilbert calculi for disjoint languages which have
theorems and obey Entailment Congruence.
As before, this result is weaker than the strong determination result for jux-
taposition. However, it can be used to combine the classical and intuitionist
consequence relations. Moreover, it can be shown that the resulting modulated
Hilbert calculus does not collapse. So modulated fibring does provide a way to
avoid the collapse of classical and intuitionist logics.
This may sound strange given our result that any consequence relation that
extends `ii and obeys Entailment Congruence collapses. Modulated fibring is de-
signed to preserve Entailment Congruence. So the modulated fibring of classical
and intuitionist logic obeys Entailment Congruence. Why doesn’t it collapse?
The answer is that the result of modulated fibring classical and intuitionist
logic (over disjoint languages by an adequate bridge) is not a consequence rela-
tion in the sense defined above. The resulting relation obeys the usual structural
rules, but it is not substitution invariant. A modulated Hilbert calculus comes
with a set of “safe substitutions” and is only guaranteed to be substitution in-
variant with respect to those substitutions. For the particular case of combining
classical and intuitionist logic, the relevant set of safe substitutions only permit
us to uniformly substitute sentences with a intuitionist main connective (or an
intuitionist sentence symbol) into the intuitionist axioms and rules.
Thus, while modulated fibring enables us to combine classical and intuitionist
logic without collapse, it does not yield a substitution invariant consequence
relation. As we will see below, juxtaposition enables us to combine classical and
intuitionist logic in a way that preserves substitution invariance. The cost is
that the resulting consequence relation does not obey Entailment Congruence.
But that seems to be a smaller cost to bear.
§5. Preservation Theorems. In this section, we prove general results about
the metalogical properties of juxtaposition. In particular, we show that if the
two signatures are disjoint, juxtaposition preserves strong soundness and strong
unital soundness. We show that under reasonable conditions, juxtaposition pre-
serves consistency. We also show that under reasonable conditions, the juxtapo-
sition of two consequence relations is a strong conservative extension of each of
them.
In what follows, in this section and the next, we assume that C1 and C2 are
two signatures and C12 is their juxtaposition. Unless otherwise specified, C1
and C2 may overlap. We assume that P1 and P2 are sets of sentence symbols
and P12 is their juxtaposition. We assume that `1 is a consequence relation
for Sent(C1, P1), `2 is a consequence relation for Sent(C2, P2), and `12 is a
consequence relation for Sent(C12, P12). Unless otherwise specified, `12 need not
be the juxtaposition of `1 and `2, or even a juxtaposed consequence relation
over `1 and `2. We also assume that C is a signature, C− is a sub-signature of
C, P is a set of sentence symbols, and ` is a consequence relation for Sent(C,P ).
5.1. The Existence of Coherent Non-Trivial Models. We first provide
a simple sufficient condition for when there is a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed
model based on a juxtaposed structure. To prove this result, we introduce an-
other semantic notion, that of a juxtaposition of two models.
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Suppose M1 = 〈B1, V1〉 is a model over C1 and P1 and M2 = 〈B2, V2〉 is a
model over C2 and P2. A juxtaposition of the models M1 andM2 is a juxtaposed
model, 〈B1, V +1 ,B2, V
+
2 〉, over C1, C2, and P12 such that:
• If p ∈ P1, V +1 (p) = V1(p); and
• If p ∈ P2, V +2 (p) = V2(p).
Notice that a juxtaposition of two unital models is a juxtaposed unital model.
A juxtaposition of two models need not be coherent. Given two models, there
need not be a coherent juxtaposition of them. If there is a coherent juxtaposition,
it need not be unique.
SupposeM12 is a juxtaposition ofM1 andM2. It is routine to show that for
any α ∈ Sent(Ci, Pi), ‖α‖M12i = ‖α‖
Mi . Therefore, if M12 is coherent then for
any α ∈ Sent(Ci, Pi), M12  α just in case Mi  α.
The following lemma provides a simple sufficient condition on when two models
have a coherent juxtaposition.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose C1 and C2 are disjoint signatures. Suppose M1 =
〈B1, V1〉 is a model over C1 and P1 and M2 = 〈B2, V2〉 is a model over C2 and
P2. Then there is a coherent juxtaposition of M1 and M2 just in case for every
p ∈ P1 ∩ P2, M1  p just in case M2  p.
Proof. Suppose there is some p ∈ P1 ∩ P2 such that M1  p and M2 2 p.
V1(p) ∈ D1 and V2(p) 6∈ D2. So there is no coherent juxtaposition of M1 and
M2. Similarly, ifM1 2 p andM2  p, there is no coherent juxtaposition ofM1
and M2.
Now suppose for every p ∈ P1 ∩ P2, M1  p just in case M2  p. We show
that there is a coherent juxtaposition of M1 and M2.
Let di be an element of Di and let ai be an element of Bi−Di. Let [ ]i be the
function from Sent(C12, P12) to Bi inductively defined as follows:
• If p ∈ Pi, [p]i = Vi(p);
• If p ∈ P1 − P2, [p]2 = d2 if V1(p) ∈ D1 and [p]2 = a2 otherwise;
• If p ∈ P2 − P1, [p]1 = d1 if V2(p) ∈ D2 and [p]1 = a1 otherwise;
• If c ∈ Cni , [cα1 . . . αn]i = Φi(c)([α1]i . . . [αn]i);
• If c ∈ Cn1 , [cα1 . . . αn]2 = d2 if Φ1(c)([α1]1 . . . [αn]1) ∈ D1 and [cα1 . . . αn]2 =
a2 otherwise;
• If c ∈ Cn2 , [cα1 . . . αn]1 = d1 if Φ2(c)([α1]2 . . . [αn]2) ∈ D2 and [cα1 . . . αn]1 =
a1 otherwise.





is a juxtaposition of M1 and M2. We show that for each α ∈ Sent(C12, P12),
‖α‖M121 ∈ D1 just in case ‖α‖
M12
2 ∈ D2. Notice that ‖α‖
M12
i = [α]i. So we need
only to show that [α]1 ∈ D1 just in case [α]2 ∈ D2.
If p ∈ P1 ∩ P2, [p]1 ∈ D1 just in case V1(p) ∈ D1 just in case M1  p just
in case M2  p just in case V2(p) ∈ D2 just in case [p]2 ∈ D2. If p ∈ P1 − P2,
[p]1 ∈ D1 just in case V1(p) ∈ D1 just in case [p]2 = d2 just in case [p]2 ∈ D2.
If p ∈ P2 − P1, [p]2 ∈ D2 just in case V2(p) ∈ D2 just in case [p]1 = d1 just
in case [P ]1 ∈ D1. If c ∈ Cn1 and α1 . . . αn ∈ Sent(C12, P12), [cα1 . . . αn]1 ∈ D1
just in case Φ1(c)([α
1]1 . . . [α
n]1) ∈ D1 just in case [cα1 . . . αn]2 = d2 (since C1
and C2 are disjoint) just in case [cα
1 . . . αn]2 ∈ D2. If c ∈ Cn2 and α1 . . . αn ∈
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Sent(C12, P12), [cα
1 . . . αn]2 ∈ D2 just in case Φ2(c)([α1]2 . . . [αn]2) ∈ D2 just in
case [cα1 . . . αn]1 = d1 (since C1 and C2 are disjoint) just in case [cα
1 . . . αn]1 ∈
D1. 
Applying this lemma, we have the following result:
Proposition 5.2 (Existence of Non-Trivial Models). Suppose C1 and C2
are disjoint signatures. Suppose B12 = 〈B1,B2〉 is a juxtaposed structure over C1
and C2. Then there is a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model over C1, C2, and
P12 based on B12.
Proof. Let V1 be a function from P1 to B1 that maps some element of P1 to
an element of D1 and some element of P1 to an element of B1−D1. Let V2 be a
function from P2 to B2 such that for every p ∈ P1 ∩ P2, V2(p) ∈ D2 just in case
V1(p) ∈ D1. It is easy to see that such functions exist. Then Mi = 〈Bi, Vi〉 is a
model over Ci and Pi. For every p ∈ P1 ∩ P2, M1  p just in case M2  p. By
Lemma 5.1, there is a coherent juxtaposition ofM1 andM2. Any juxtaposition
of M1 and M2 is non-trivial and is based on B12. So there is a coherent non-
trivial juxtaposed model over C1, C2, and P12 based on B12. 
The restriction to disjoint signatures is important. There are juxtaposed struc-
tures that do not have coherent juxtaposed models based on them. For example,
let C be a signature with a single unary connective, c. Let B = {0, 1} and
D = {1}. Let Φ1(c) be the identity mapping on B and let Φ2(c) be the function
that maps 0 to 1 and 1 to 0. Let B1 = 〈B,D,Φ1〉 and let B2 = 〈B,D,Φ2〉. It is
easy to see that there is no coherent juxtaposed model based on 〈B1,B2〉. There
are also juxtaposed structures that have only trivial coherent juxtaposed models
based on them. For example, let Φ′2(c) be the function that maps both 0 and 1
to 1. Let B′2 = 〈B,D,Φ′2〉. It is easy to see that the only coherent juxtaposed
models based on 〈B1,B′2〉 are trivial.
5.2. The Preservation of Strong Soundness. Our next general result
concerns the preservation of strong soundness by juxtaposition. We show that
if `1 is strongly sound with respect to B1 and `2 is strongly sound with respect
to B2 then the juxtaposition of `1 and `2 is strongly sound with respect to
the juxtaposition of B1 and B2. This result does not require that C1 and C2
be disjoint. However, to show that juxtaposition preserves strong soundness or
strong unital soundness (simpliciter), we must show that there is a coherent non-
trivial juxtaposed model based on B12. In the case where C1 and C2 are disjoint,
we can apply Proposition 5.2.
Lemma 5.3. Suppose B12 is a class of juxtaposed structures over C1 and C2.
Then B12 is a consequence relation for Sent(C12, P12).
Proof. B12 is a relation between subsets of Sent(C12, P12) and individual
elements of Sent(C12, P12). It suffices to show that B12 satisfies Identity, Weak-
ening, Cut, and Uniform Substitution.
Identity: Trivially, every coherent juxtaposed model based on B12 that desig-
nates α designates α. So {α} B12 α.
Weakening: Suppose Γ B12 α. So every coherent juxtaposed model based on
B12 that designates each element of Γ also designates α. In particular, every
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coherent juxtaposed model based on B12 that designates each element of Γ ∪∆
also designates α. So Γ ∪∆ B12 α.
Cut: Suppose Γ B12 α and ∆ ∪ {α} B12 β. Suppose M12 is a coherent
juxtaposed model based on B12 that designates each element of Γ ∪ ∆. Since
every coherent juxtaposed model based on B12 that designates each element of
Γ also designates α, M12 designates α. Since every coherent juxtaposed model
based on B12 that designates each element of ∆ ∪ {α} also designates β, M12
designates β. So Γ ∪∆ B12 β.
Uniform Substitution: Suppose Γ[β/p] 2B12 α[β/p]. Since Γ[β/p] 2B12 α[β/p],
there is a coherent juxtaposed model M12 = 〈B1, V1,B2, V2〉 based on B12 that
designates each element of Γ[β/p] but does not designate α[β/p]. Let V ′i (δ) =
‖δ[β/p]‖M12i if δ is an i-atom. LetM′12 = 〈B1, V ′1 ,B2, V ′2〉. Clearly,M′12 is a jux-






i . SinceM12 is coherent, so isM′12. M′12 designates each
element of Γ but does not designate α. Therefore, Γ 2B12 α. 
Lemma 5.4. Suppose B12 is the juxtaposition of B1 and B2. If Γ B1 α or
Γ B2 α, then Γ B12 α.
Proof. Suppose Γ Bi α for some i ∈ {1, 2}, Γ ⊆ Sent(Ci, Pi), and α ∈
Sent(Ci, Pi). Suppose M12 = 〈B1, V1,B2, V2〉 is a coherent juxtaposed model
based on B12 such that M12  Γ. Let Vi|Pi be the restriction of Vi to Pi. Let
Mi|Pi = 〈Bi, Vi|Pi〉. Mi|Pi is a model over Ci and Pi. For every β ∈ Sent(Ci, Pi),
‖β‖Mi|Pi = ‖β‖M12i . So Mi|Pi  Γ. Since Mi|Pi is based on Bi, Mi|Pi  α. So
M12  α. Therefore, Γ B12 α. 
Theorem 5.5 (Preservation of Strong Soundness). Suppose `12 is the jux-
taposition of `1 and `2 and B12 is the juxtaposition of B1 and B2. If `1 is
strongly sound with respect to B1 and `2 is strongly sound with respect to B2,
then `12 is strongly sound with respect to B12.
Proof. By the definition of `12, it suffices to show that B12 is a consequence
relation for Sent(C12, P12) such that if Γ `1 α or Γ `2 α then Γ B12 α. By
Lemma 5.3, B12 is a consequence relation for Sent(C12, P12). By strong sound-
ness, if Γ `1 α then Γ B1 α and if Γ `2 α then Γ B2 α. By Lemma 5.4,
if Γ B1 α or Γ B2 α then Γ B12 α. Therefore, if Γ `1 α or Γ `2 α then
Γ B12 α. 
This result is fully general – in particular, it does not require that C1 and
C2 be disjoint. However, to show that juxtaposition preserves strong soundness
or strong unital soundness (simpliciter), we must show that there is a coherent
non-trivial juxtaposed model based on B12. If C1 and C2 are disjoint, we can
apply Proposition 5.2. Indeed, if C1 and C2 are disjoint, we can show that the
juxtaposition of two consequence relations is strongly sound just in case both of
them are. To prove this stronger result, we first need to prove a simple lemma.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose C1 and C2 are disjoint signatures. Suppose B12 is the
juxtaposition of B1 and B2, each of which is a non-empty class of structures. For
any i ∈ {1, 2}, Γ ⊆ Sent(Ci, Pi), and α ∈ Sent(Ci, Pi), if Γ B12 α, then Γ Bi α.
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Proof. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C1, P1) and α ∈ Sent(C1, P1). Suppose Γ 2B1 α.
So there is a model M1 based on B1 such that M1  Γ and M1 2 α. Since B2
is non-empty, there are models based on it. By Lemma 5.1, there is a coherent
juxtaposed modelM12 based on B12 that is the juxtaposition ofM1 with some
M2 based on B2. (We must pick M2 so that it designates the same elements of
P1 ∩ P2 as M1.) So M12  Γ and M12 2 α. Therefore, Γ 2B12 α.
The case where Γ ⊆ Sent(C2, P2) and α ∈ Sent(C2, P2) is analogous. 
Corollary 5.7. Suppose C1 and C2 are disjoint signatures. Suppose `12
is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2. Then:
1. `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly sound just in case `1 and `2 are each strongly
sound;
2. `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital sound just in case `1 and `2 are each strongly
unital sound.
Proof. Suppose `1 is strongly sound with respect to B1 and `2 is strongly
sound with respect to B2, where B1 and B2 are non-empty classes of structures.
Let B12 be the juxtaposition of B1 and B2. By Theorem 5.5, `12 is strongly sound
with respect to B12. Since B1 and B2 are non-empty, so is B12. By Proposition
5.2, there is a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model based on B12. Therefore,
`12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly sound.
Now suppose `12 is strongly sound with respect to B12, a non-empty class of
structures. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(Ci, Pi) and α ∈ Sent(Ci, Pi). Suppose Γ 2Bi α.
Since B12 is non-empty, so are B1 and B2. By Lemma 5.6, Γ 2B12 α. By strong
soundness, Γ 012 α. So Γ 0i α. So `i is strongly sound with respect to Bi, a
non-empty class of structures. Therefore, `1 and `2 are each strongly sound.
B12 is a class of juxtaposed unital structures just in case B1 and B2 are each
classes of unital structures. Therefore, `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital sound just
in case `1 and `2 are each strongly unital sound. 
5.3. Conservativeness and Consistency. Our next general results con-
cern conservativeness and the preservation of consistency.
We first provide a sufficient condition on when the juxtaposition of two con-
sequence relations is a strong conservative extension of the original relations.
Proposition 5.8. Suppose C1 and C2 are disjoint signatures. Suppose `12
is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2. If `1 and `2 are each strongly determined,
then `12 is a strong conservative extension of each of `1 and `2.
Proof. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(Ci, Pi) and α ∈ Sent(Ci, Pi).
Suppose Γ `i α. By the definition of `12, Γ `12 α.
Now suppose Γ `12 α. Suppose `1 is strongly determined with respect to B1
and `2 is strongly determined with respect to B2, where B1 and B2 are non-
empty classes of structures. Let B12 be the juxtaposition of B1 and B2. By
Theorem 5.5, `12 is strongly sound with respect to B12. So Γ B12 α. By Lemma
5.6, Γ Bi α. Therefore, by strong completeness, Γ `i α. 
Conservativeness is closely tied to consistency. If Γ is consistent with respect to
some consequence relation, Γ is consistent with respect to any strong conservative
extension of it. Thus, we have the following:
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Proposition 5.9. Suppose C1 and C2 are disjoint signatures. Suppose `12
is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2. Suppose `1 and `2 are each strongly deter-
mined. If (for i = 1 or 2) Γ ⊆ Sent(Ci, Pi) is consistent with respect to `i, then
Γ is consistent with respect to `12.
Combining these results with Theorem 2.1, the following results are immediate:
Theorem 5.10 (Preservation of Consistency). Suppose C1 and C2 are dis-
joint signatures. Suppose each of `1 and `2 is consistent and has no mere
followers. Suppose `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2. Then `12 is consistent.
If Γ ⊆ Sent(Ci, Pi) is consistent with respect to `i, Γ is consistent with respect
to `12.
Theorem 5.11 (Strong Conservativeness). Suppose C1 and C2 are disjoint
signatures. Suppose each of `1 and `2 is consistent and has no mere followers.
Suppose `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2. Then `12 is a strong conservative
extension of each of `1 and `2.36
§6. Strong Completeness and Strong Determination. As usual, it is
somewhat more difficult to prove completeness results. In this section, we present
direct proofs of strong completeness and strong unital completeness that apply in
a wide range of cases.37 The general strategy of proof relies on a modification of
the familiar Lindenbaum-Tarski constructions.38 We first prove a very abstract
completeness result that requires there to be suitable equivalence relations with
which to build our Lindenbaum-Tarski models. We then investigate when such
relations exist.
6.1. The Lindenbaum-Tarski Construction. Let ∼ be an equivalence
relation on Sent(C,P ). We say that ∼ is a congruence over C− just in case:
• For every c− ∈ C−n, α1, . . . , αn, β ∈ Sent(C,P ), and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if
αk ∼ β then c−α1 . . . αk . . . αn ∼ c−α1 . . . β . . . αn.
We say that ∼ is compatible with ` and Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ) just in case:
• For every α, β ∈ Sent(C,P ), if α ∼ β then Γ ` α just in case Γ ` β.
We say that ∼ is strongly compatible with ` and Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ) just in case ∼
is compatible with ` and Γ and:
• For every α, β ∈ Sent(C,P ), if both Γ ` α and Γ ` β then α ∼ β.
We say that ∼ is suitable for C−, `, and Γ just in case ∼ is a congruence over
C− compatible with ` and Γ. We say that ∼ is unital suitable for C−, `, and Γ
just in case ∼ is a congruence over C− strongly compatible with ` and Γ. We
36See Cruz-Filipe et al. (2007), Proposition 2.17, for a slightly stronger result. In particular,
the juxtaposition of two non-trivial consequence relations over disjoint signatures is a strong
conservative extension of each of them. Their proof of this result is purely proof-theoretic,
relying on a fixed-point argument.
37See Zanardo et al. (2001) and Sernadas et al. (2002) for completeness results concerning
algebraic fibring and modulated fibring, respectively.
38See Rasiowa (1974) and Rasiowa & Sikorski (1970) for the application of the Lindenbaum-
Tarski method to logics that contain conditionals. See Blok & Pigozzi (1989) for the application
of this method in a more general setting.
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make use of suitable and unital suitable equivalence relations in constructing our
Lindenbaum-Tarski models.
Suppose Γ is a non-empty subset of Sent(C12, P12) consistent with respect to
`12. Suppose for each i ∈ {1, 2}, ∼Γi is an equivalence relation on Sent(C12, P12)
suitable for Ci, `12, and Γ. We make the following definitions:





i | α ∈ Sent(C12, P12)}
DΓi = {|α|
Γ
i | Γ `12 α}
If ci ∈ Cni ,ΦΓi (ci)(|α1|
Γ
i , . . . , |α
n|Γi ) = |ciα
1 . . . αn|Γi
BΓi = 〈BΓi ,DΓi ,ΦΓi 〉
BΓ12 = 〈BΓ1 ,BΓ2 〉
If α is an i-atom,VΓi (α) = |α|
Γ
i
MΓ12 = 〈BΓ1 ,VΓ1 ,BΓ2 ,VΓ2 〉
BΓ12 is the Lindenbaum-Tarski juxtaposed structure for C1, C2, `12, and Γ built
with ∼Γ1 and ∼Γ2 . MΓ12 is the Lindenbaum-Tarski juxtaposed model for C1, C2,
`12, and Γ built with ∼Γ1 and ∼Γ2 .
Notice that if ∼Γ1 =∼Γ2 , then BΓ1 = BΓ2 , DΓ1 = DΓ2 , VΓ1 (p) = VΓ2 (p) for p ∈ P12,
and |α|1 = |α|2 for α ∈ Sent(C12, P12).
Lemma 6.1. Suppose Γ is a non-empty subset of Sent(C12, P12) consistent
with respect to `12. Suppose for each i ∈ {1, 2}, ∼Γi is an equivalence relation
on Sent(C12, P12) suitable for Ci, `12, and Γ. Then MΓ12 is a juxtaposed model
over C1, C2, and P12 based on B
Γ
12.
Proof. |α|Γi is well defined: ∼Γi is an equivalence relation.
DΓi is well-defined: Suppose α ∼Γi β. By compatibility with ` and Γ, Γ `12 α
just in case Γ `12 β.
DΓi is a proper subset of B
Γ
i : Clearly, D
Γ
i is a subset of B
Γ
i . Since Γ is consistent
with respect to `12, there is some α ∈ Sent(C12, P12) such that Γ 012 α. So
|α|Γi 6∈ DΓi .
DΓi is non-empty: Since Γ is non-empty, there is some γ ∈ Γ. By Identity and
Weakening, Γ `12 γ. So |γ|Γi ∈ DΓi .
For every ci ∈ Cni , ΦΓi (ci) is well-defined: Suppose for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
|αk|Γi = |β|
Γ
i . Since ∼Γi is a congruence over Ci, |ciα1 . . . αk . . . αn|
Γ
i =
|ciα1 . . . β . . . αn|
Γ
i .
Clearly, for every ci ∈ Cni , ΦΓi (ci) is a function from the n-th Cartesian power
of BΓi to B
Γ
i . So B
Γ
12 is a juxtaposed structure over C1 and C2. V
Γ
i is a function
from the set of i-atoms to BΓi . Therefore, M
Γ
12 is a juxtaposed model over C1,
C2, and P12 based on B
Γ
12. 
Lemma 6.2. Suppose Γ is a non-empty subset of Sent(C12, P12) consistent
with respect to `12. Suppose for each i ∈ {1, 2}, ∼Γi is an equivalence relation
on Sent(C12, P12) suitable for Ci, `12, and Γ. Then:







2. MΓ12 is coherent;
3. MΓ12  α just in case Γ `12 α;
4. MΓ12 is non-trivial.
Proof. By Lemma 6.1, MΓ12 is a juxtaposed model over C1, C2, and P12.





i (α) = |α|
Γ
i . For every ci ∈ Cni and
α1, . . . , αn ∈ Sent(C12, P12), ‖ciα1 . . . αn‖
MΓ12 = ΦΓi (ci)(|α1|
Γ
i . . . |αn|
Γ
i ) =
|ciα1 . . . αn|
Γ










i ∈ DΓi just in case |α|
Γ
i ∈ DΓi just in case Γ `12 α. So ‖α‖
MΓ12
1 ∈ DΓ1
just in case ‖α‖M
Γ
12
2 ∈ DΓ2 . Therefore, MΓ12 is coherent.
MΓ12  α just in case ‖α‖
MΓ12
i ∈ DΓi just in case Γ `12 α.
Since Γ is non-empty, there is a γ ∈ Sent(C12, P12) such that γ ∈ Γ. By
Identity and Weakening, Γ `12 γ. So MΓ12  γ. Since Γ is consistent with
respect to `12, there is an α ∈ Sent(C12, P12) such that Γ 012 α. So MΓ12 2 α.
Therefore, MΓ12 is non-trivial. 
The next result tells us when BΓ12 is a juxtaposed unital structure:
Proposition 6.3. Suppose Γ is a non-empty subset of Sent(C12, P12) con-
sistent with respect to `12. Suppose for each i ∈ {1, 2}, ∼Γi is an equivalence
relation on Sent(C12, P12) suitable for Ci, `12, and Γ. Then BΓ12 is a juxtaposed
unital structure just in case for each i ∈ {1, 2}, ∼Γi is unital suitable for Ci, `12,
and Γ.
Proof. Suppose for each i ∈ {1, 2}, ∼Γi is unital suitable for Ci, `12, and Γ.
By Lemma 6.1, BΓ12 is a juxtaposed structure. Suppose |α|
Γ
i ∈ DΓi and |β|
Γ
i ∈ DΓi .
So Γ `12 α and Γ `12 β. By strong compatibility with ` and Γ, α ∼Γi β. So
|α|Γi = |β|
Γ
i . Therefore, B
Γ
12 is a juxtaposed unital structure.
Now suppose BΓ12 is a juxtaposed unital structure. Suppose Γ `12 α and
Γ `12 β. So |α|Γi ∈ DΓi and |β|
Γ





α ∼Γi β. Therefore, ∼Γi is unital suitable. 
Suppose for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) consis-
tent with `12, ∼Γi is an equivalence relation on Sent(C12, P12) suitable for Ci,
`12, and Γ. We define the following class of juxtaposed structures:
B∼12 = {BΓ12 |Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) is non-empty and consistent with respect to `12
and BΓ12 is built with ∼Γ1 and ∼Γ2}
B∼12 is the Lindenbaum-Tarski class of juxtaposed structures for C1, C2, and `12
built with the ∼Γi relations.
Theorem 6.4 (Strong Completeness). Suppose `12 has no mere followers.
Suppose for every i ∈ {1, 2} and non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) consistent with
respect to `12, ∼Γi is an equivalence relation on Sent(C12, P12) suitable for Ci,
`12, and Γ. Then `12 is strongly complete with respect to B∼12.
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Proof. Suppose Γ 012 α. We show Γ 2B
∼
12 α. Since `12 has no mere followers,
without loss of generality, we can take Γ to be non-empty. (If Γ = ∅, there is
a non-empty ∆ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) such that ∆ 012 α. We can take ∆ to be our
non-empty set.) By Lemma 6.1, MΓ12 is a juxtaposed model over C1, C2, and
P12. By Lemma 6.2, M
Γ
12 is a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model such that
MΓ12  Γ and M
Γ
12 2 α. Since MΓ12 is based on B∼12, Γ 2B
∼
12 α. 
To show that `12 is strongly determined with respect to B∼12, we also need to
show that `12 is strongly sound with respect to B∼12. If `12 is the juxtaposition
of `1 and `2, we can make use of Theorem 5.5.
Theorem 6.5 (Strong Soundness). Suppose `12 is the juxtaposition of `1
and `2. Suppose for every i ∈ {1, 2} and non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) consis-
tent with respect to `12, ∼Γi is an equivalence relation on Sent(C12, P12) suitable
for Ci, `12, and Γ. Then `12 is strongly sound with respect to B∼12.
Proof. For i = 1 and 2, let B∼i = {BΓi | Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) is non-empty
and consistent with respect to `12 and BΓi is built with ∼Γi }. We first show that
`i is strongly sound with respect to B∼i .
Suppose Γ 2B∼i α for Γ ⊆ Sent(Ci, Pi) and α ∈ Sent(Ci, Pi). Then there is a
model Mi over Ci and Pi based on B∼i such that Mi  Γ and Mi 2 α. Mi
is based on B∆i ∈ B∼i , for some non-empty ∆ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) consistent with
respect to `12. By Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2, M∆12 is a coherent juxtaposed model over





Mi . Such a sentence exists by the construction of M∆12. By
a simple induction, for any β ∈ Sent(Ci, Pi), ‖βσ‖
M∆12
i = ‖β‖
Mi . So M∆12  Γ
σ
and M∆12 2 ασ. By Lemma 6.2, for each γ ∈ Γ, ∆ `12 γσ and ∆ 012 ασ. By Cut,
Γσ 012 ασ. By Uniform Substitution, Γ 012 α. Since `12 extends `i, Γ 0i α.
Thus, `i is strongly sound with respect to B∼i .
By Theorem 5.5, `12 is strongly sound with respect to B∼1 ×B∼2 . Since B∼12 ⊆
B∼1 × B∼2 , `12 is strongly sound with respect to B∼12.39 
To show that `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly determined or 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital
determined, we need to show that there is a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed
model based on B∼12. We can make use of the following simple result:
Proposition 6.6. Suppose `12 has no mere followers. Suppose for every
i ∈ {1, 2} and non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) consistent with respect to `12, ∼Γi
is an equivalence relation on Sent(C12, P12) suitable for Ci, `12, and Γ. Then if
`12 is consistent, there is a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model based on B∼12.
Proof. Since `12 is consistent, for some α ∈ Sent(C12, P12), 012 α. Since
`12 has no mere followers, for some non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12), Γ 012 α. By
Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2, MΓ12 is a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model based on
B∼12. 
39We could make use of B∼1 × B∼2 instead of B∼12 in our results in this section. We focus on
B∼12 because it is a slightly more elegant construction.
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Notice that in the case that `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly sound with respect to
B∼12, we also get the converse of this result: Suppose there is a coherent non-
trivial juxtaposed model M12 based on B∼12. Since M12 is non-trivial, for some
α ∈ Sent(C12, P12),M12 2 α. By strong soundness, 012 α. So, `12 is consistent.
Summarizing our results, we have the following:
Theorem 6.7. Suppose `12 has no mere followers. Suppose for every i ∈
{1, 2} and non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) consistent with respect to `12, ∼Γi is
an equivalence relation on Sent(C12, P12) suitable for Ci, `12, and Γ. Then:
1. `12 is strongly complete with respect to B∼12;
2. If `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2, then `12 is strongly sound with
respect to B∼12;
3. If `12 is consistent, then there is a coherent non-trivial model based on B∼12;
4. B∼12 is a class of juxtaposed unital structures just in case for every i ∈ {1, 2}
and non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) consistent with respect to `12, ∼Γi is
unital suitable for Ci, `12, and Γ.
6.2. Strong Determination. Theorem 6.7 raises the question of when there
is an equivalence relation on Sent(C12, P12) suitable or unital suitable for Ci, `12,
and Γ. The case of suitability is straightforward. The following result is easy to
prove:
Lemma 6.8. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ). Then the identity relation on
Sent(C,P ) is an equivalence relation on Sent(C,P ) suitable for C−, `, and Γ.
Let B=12 be the Lindenbaum-Tarski class of juxtaposed structures for C1, C2,
and `12, using the identity relation on Sent(C12, P12) for the suitable equivalence
relations. Combining Lemma 6.8 with Theorem 6.7, we arrive at the following
result:
Proposition 6.9. Suppose `12 has no mere followers. Then:
1. `12 is strongly complete with respect to B=12;
2. If `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2, then `12 is strongly sound with
respect to B=12;
3. If `12 is consistent, then there is a coherent non-trivial model based on B=12.
The identity relation on Sent(C,P ) is the most fine-grained equivalence rela-
tion suitable for C−, `, and Γ. We can also characterize the most coarse-grained
such relation.
We say that p strictly C−-occurs in δ just in case p does not occur within the
scope of any connective not from C−. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ). We define a
binary relation on Sent(C,P ) as follows:
〈α, β〉 ∈ ΩΓC− just in case for every δ ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p that strictly C
−-occurs in δ,
Γ ` δ[α/p] just in case Γ ` δ[β/p].
This is a modification of the definition of the well-known Leibniz congruence.40
We write α ≡ β (mod ΩΓC−) to stand for the claim that 〈α, β〉 ∈ Ω
Γ
C− .
40The Leibniz congruence may be defined as follows: α ≡ β (mod ΩΓ) just in case for every
δ ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p occurring in δ, Γ ` δ[α/p] just in case Γ ` δ[β/p]. See Blok & Pigozzi
(1989) for discussion of this congruence.
JUXTAPOSITION: A NEW WAY TO COMBINE LOGICS 23
Lemma 6.10. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ). Then ΩΓC− is an equivalence relation
on Sent(C,P ) suitable for C−, `, and Γ.
Proof. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ).
Clearly, ΩΓC− is an equivalence relation on Sent(C,P ).
Congruence over C−: Suppose c− ∈ C−n; α1, . . . , αn, β ∈ Sent(C,P ); and
k ∈ {1, . . . n}. Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p strictly C−-occurs in δ. Sup-
pose αk ≡ β (mod ΩΓC−). Let q be an element of P that does not occur in
δ or in α1, . . . , αn. Then q strictly C−-occurs in δ[c−α1 . . . q . . . αn/p]. So
Γ ` δ[c−α1 . . . αk . . . αn/p] just in case Γ ` δ[c−α1 . . . q . . . αn/p][αk/q] just in
case Γ ` δ[c−α1 . . . q . . . αn/p][β/q] (by the definition of ΩΓC−) just in case Γ `
δ[c−α1 . . . β . . . αn/p]. Hence, c−α1 . . . αk . . . αn ≡ c−α1 . . . β . . . αn (mod ΩΓC−).
Compatibility with ` and Γ: Suppose α ≡ β (mod ΩΓC−). Γ ` α just in
case Γ ` p[α/p] just in case Γ ` p[β/p] (by the definition of ΩΓC−) just in case
Γ ` β. 
It is straightforward to show that ΩΓC− is the most coarse-grained equivalence
relation on Sent(C,P ) suitable for C−, `, and Γ:
Proposition 6.11. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ). Suppose ∼ is an equivalence
relation on Sent(C,P ) suitable for C−, `, and Γ. Then if α ∼ β, α ≡ β
(mod ΩΓC−).
Proof. Suppose α ∼ β. Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p strictly C−-occurs
in δ. By induction on the complexity of δ, δ[α/p] ∼ δ[β/p]. By compatibility
with ` and Γ for ∼, Γ ` δ[α/p] just in case Γ ` δ[β/p]. Therefore, α ≡ β
(mod ΩΓC−). 
Let BΩ12 be the Lindenbaum-Tarski class of juxtaposed structures for C1, C2,
and `12, built using the ΩΓCi relations. Combining Lemma 6.10 with Theorem
6.7, we arrive at the following result:
Proposition 6.12. Suppose `12 has no mere followers. Then:
1. `12 is strongly complete with respect to BΩ12;
2. If `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2, then `12 is strongly sound with
respect to BΩ12;
3. If `12 is consistent, then there is a coherent non-trivial model based on BΩ12.
Making use of either Proposition 6.9 or Proposition 6.12, we have the following
sufficient condition on 〈C1, C2〉-strong determination:
Corollary 6.13. Suppose `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2, is consis-
tent, and has no mere followers. Then `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly determined.
6.3. Strong Unital Determination. Let’s now consider the case of unital
suitability. We first provide a necessary and sufficient condition for ΩΓC− to be
unital suitable for C−, `, and Γ.
We say that ` is C−-left-extensional just in case for every α, β, δ ∈ Sent(C,P )
and p that strictly C−-occurs in δ, {α, β, δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p]. This is a generaliza-
tion of the definition of left-extensionality presented above: ` is left-extensional
(simpliciter) just in case ` is C-left-extensional.
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Lemma 6.14. ` is C−-left-extensional just in case for every non-empty Γ ⊆
Sent(C,P ) consistent with respect to `, ΩΓC− is unital suitable for C
−, `, and Γ
Proof. Suppose ` is C−-left-extensional. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ). By
Lemma 6.10, ΩΓC− is suitable for C
−, `, and Γ. Suppose Γ ` α and Γ ` β.
Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p strictly C−-occurs in δ. By C−-left-extensionality,
{α, β, δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p]. By Cut, if Γ ` δ[α/p] then Γ ` δ[β/p]. By analogous
reasoning, if Γ ` δ[β/p] then Γ ` δ[α/p]. So α ≡ β (mod ΩΓC−). Therefore, Ω
Γ
C−
is strongly compatible with ` and Γ.
Now suppose for every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ) consistent with respect to
`, ΩΓC− is unital suitable for C
−, `, and Γ. Suppose α, β, δ ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p
strictly C−-occurs in δ. If {α, β, δ[α/p]} is inconsistent with respect to `, then
{α, β, δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p]. Suppose, then, that {α, β, δ[α/p]} is consistent with
respect to `. So Ω{α,β,δ[α/p]}C− is unital suitable for C
−, `, and {α, β, δ[α/p]}.
By Identity and Weakening, {α, β, δ[α/p]} ` α and {α, β, δ[α/p]} ` β. By
strong compatibility with ` and {α, β, δ[α/p]}, α ≡ β (mod Ω{α,β,δ[α/p]}C− ). So
{α, β, δ[α/p]} ` δ[α/p] just in case {α, β, δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p]. By Identity and
Weakening, {α, β, δ[α/p]} ` δ[α/p]. So, again, {α, β, δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p]. There-
fore, ` is C−-left-extensional. 
Combining this lemma with Theorem 6.7, we arrive at the following result:
Proposition 6.15. Suppose `12 has no mere followers. Then BΩ12 is a class
of juxtaposed unital structures just in case `12 is C1- and C2-left-extensional.
Notice that the claim that `12 is C1- and C2-left-extensional is weaker than
the claim that `12 is left-extensional (simpliciter).
Making use of Propositions 6.12 and 6.15, we have the following sufficient
condition on 〈C1, C2〉-strong unital determination:
Corollary 6.16. Suppose `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2, is consis-
tent, has no mere followers, and is C1- and C2-left-extensional. Then `12 is
〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital determined.
6.4. An Improvement. We can improve Corollary 6.16. Suppose ∆ ⊆
Sent(C,P ). We say that ` is left-extensional over ∆ just in case for every
α, β ∈ Sent(C,P ), δ ∈ ∆, and p occurring in δ, {α, β, δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p]. This is a
different generalization of the notion of left-extensionality than the one presented
above. ` is left-extensional (simpliciter) just in case ` is left-extensional over
Sent(C,P ). We can improve Corollary 6.16 by showing that if `12 is the juxta-
position of `1 and `2, is consistent, has no mere followers, and is left-extensional
over Sent(C1, P1) and over Sent(C2, P2), then `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital de-
termined.
The cost of this improvement is that we must move to a more complicated
equivalence relation (for each C−, `, and Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P )). In particular, we
make use of a modification of (one characterization of) the Suszko congruence.41
41The Suszko congruence may be defined as follows: α ≡ β (mod ΣΓ) just in case for every
δ ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p occurring in δ, Γ ∪ {δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p] and Γ ∪ {δ[β/p]} ` δ[α/p]. See
Czelakowski (2003) for discussion of this congruence.
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In defining this relation, it turns out to be helpful to work with an expansion of
our language.
Let P ∗ be a countably infinite set of sentence symbols disjoint with P . (In
what follows, we always choose P ∗ to be disjoint with whatever sets of sentence
symbols we are working with.) Let `∗ be the least consequence relation for
Sent(C,P ∪ P ∗) that extends `.
Lemma 6.17. `∗ exists and is a strong conservative extension of `.
Proof. Let σ be any function from P ∗ to P . Let Γ `σ α just in case Γσ ` ασ.
It is routine to show that `σ is a consequence relation for Sent(C,P ∪ P ∗) that
extends `. It is also routine to show that the intersection of all consequence
relations for Sent(C,P ∪ P ∗) that extend ` is itself a consequence relation for
Sent(C,P ∪ P ∗). Therefore, `∗ exists.
Suppose Γ ` α. Since `∗ extends `, Γ `∗ α. Now suppose Γ 0 α. Again
let σ be any function from P ∗ to P . It is easy to see that Γ 0σ α. So Γ 0∗ α.
Therefore, `∗ is a strong conservative extension of `. 
Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ). We define a binary relation on Sent(C,P ) as follows:
〈α, β〉 ∈ ΣΓC− just in case for every δ ∈ Sent(C
−, P ∪ P ∗) and p occurring in δ,
Γ ∪ {δ[α/p]} `∗ δ[β/p] and Γ ∪ {δ[β/p]} `∗ δ[α/p].
We write α ≡ β (mod ΣΓC−) to stand for the claim that 〈α, β〉 ∈ Σ
Γ
C− .
In this definition, δ is restricted to sentences with connectives from C−. This
is what enables us to improve our strong unital determination result. However,
this is also what motivates the use of an extra set of sentence symbols. By
making use of the elements of P ∗, we can apply Uniform Substitution to show
that ΣΓC− is a congruence over C
− even when Γ contains occurrences of every
element in P .42
Lemma 6.18. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ). Then ΣΓC− is an equivalence relation
on Sent(C,P ) suitable for C−, `, and Γ.
Proof. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ).
Clearly, ΣΓC− is an equivalence relation on Sent(C,P ).
Congruence over C−: Suppose c− ∈ C−n; α1, . . . , αn, β ∈ Sent(C,P ); and
k ∈ {1, . . . n}. Suppose αk ≡ β (mod ΣΓC−). Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C
−, P ∪ P ∗) and
p occurs in δ. Let p1, . . . , pn be distinct elements of P ∗ that do not occur in δ.
Γ ∪ {δ[c−p1 . . . pk . . . pn/p][αk/pk]} `∗ δ[c−p1 . . . pk . . . pn/p][β/pk]. That is, Γ ∪
{δ[c−p1 . . . αk . . . pn/p]} `∗ δ[c−p1 . . . β . . . pn/p]. By Uniform Substitution, Γ ∪
{δ[c−α1 . . . αk . . . αn/p]} `∗ δ[c−α1 . . . β . . . αn/p]. By analogous reasoning, Γ ∪
42There is an alternative approach that we could instead have adopted. The idea is to
make use of the following equivalence relation: 〈α, β〉 ∈ Σ′Γ
C−
just in case for every δ ∈
Sent(C−, P ) and p occurring in δ, Γ ∪ {δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p] and Γ ∪ {δ[β/p]} ` δ[α/p]. Using
Uniform Substitution, we can show that if Γ lacks occurrences of infinitely many elements of P
then Σ′Γ
C−
is a congruence over C−. If were to adopt this approach, we would have to modify
our definition of the Lindenbaum-Tarski class of juxtaposed structures so that it contains a
juxtaposed structure for every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) consistent with respect to `12
that lacks occurrences of infinitely many elements of P12. In effect, we would be working with
restrictions of the language rather than an expansion of it.
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{δ[c−α1 . . . β . . . αn/p]} `∗ δ[c−α1 . . . αk . . . αn/p]. Hence, c−α1 . . . αk . . . αn ≡
c−α1 . . . β . . . αn (mod ΣΓC−).
Compatibility with ` and Γ: Suppose α ≡ β (mod ΣΓC−). Let p ∈ P . So
Γ ∪ {p[α/p]} `∗ p[β/p]. That is, Γ ∪ {α} `∗ β. By Lemma 6.17, Γ ∪ {α} ` β.
Similarly, Γ ∪ {β} ` α. By Cut, Γ ` α just in case Γ ` β. 
Before we provide conditions for when ΣΓC− is unital suitable for C
−, `, and
Γ, we first prove two simple results concerning left-extensionality over a set:
Lemma 6.19. Suppose ∆ ⊆ Sent(C,P ). Suppose ` is left-extensional over
∆. Then any consequence relation that extends ` is left-extensional over ∆.
Proof. Suppose C is a sub-signature of C+ and P is a subset of P+. Suppose
`+ is a consequence relation for Sent(C+, P+) that extends `. Suppose α, β ∈
Sent(C+, P+); δ ∈ ∆; and p occurs in δ. Let q and r be distinct elements of
P that do not occur in δ. Since ` is left-extensional over ∆, {q, r, δ[q/p]} `
δ[r/p]. Since `+ extends `, {q, r, δ[q/p]} `+ δ[r/p]. By Uniform Substitution,
{α, β, δ[α/p]} `+ δ[β/p]. Therefore, `+ is left-extensional over ∆. 
Lemma 6.20. Suppose P− is an infinite subset of P . Then ` is left-exten-
sional over Sent(C−, P ) just in case ` is left-extensional over Sent(C−, P−).
Proof. Suppose ` is left-extensional over Sent(C−, P ). Since Sent(C−, P−)
is a subset of Sent(C−, P ), ` is left-extensional over Sent(C−, P−).
Now suppose ` is left-extensional over Sent(C−, P−). Suppose that δ ∈
Sent(C−, P ); α, β ∈ Sent(C,P ); and p occurs in δ. Let P δ contain those el-
ements of P − P− that occur in δ. Let P ∗ contain those elements of P− that
do not occur in α, β, or δ. Let σ be an injective function from P δ to P ∗.
Such a function exists since P δ is finite and P ∗ is infinite. By left-extensionality
over Sent(C−, P−), {ασ, βσ, δσ[ασ/pσ]} ` δσ[βσ/pσ]. By Uniform Substitution,
{α, β, δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p]. Therefore, ` is left-extensional over Sent(C−, P ). 
Making use of these results, we can prove the following result:
Lemma 6.21. ` is left-extensional over Sent(C−, P ) just in case for every
non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ) consistent with respect to `, ΣΓC− is unital suitable
for C−, `, and Γ.
Proof. Suppose ` is left-extensional over Sent(C−, P ). Suppose that Γ ⊆
Sent(C,P ). By Lemma 6.18, for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ), ΣΓC− is suitable for C
−,
`, and Γ. Suppose Γ ` α and Γ ` β. Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C−, P ∪P ∗) and p occurs
in δ. By Lemma 6.19, `∗ is left-extensional over Sent(C−, P ). By Lemma 6.20,
`∗ is left-extensional over Sent(C−, P ∪ P ∗). So {α, β, δ[α/p]} `∗ δ[β/p]. Since
`∗ extends `, Γ `∗ α and Γ `∗ β. By Cut, Γ ∪ {δ[α/p]} `∗ δ[β/p]. Similarly,
Γ∪{δ[β/p]} `∗ δ[α/p]. So α ≡ β (mod ΣΓC−). So Σ
Γ
C− is unital suitable for C
−,
`, and Γ.
Now suppose for every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ) consistent with respect
to `, ΣΓC− is unital suitable for C
−, `, and Γ. Suppose α, β ∈ Sent(C,P );
δ ∈ Sent(C−, P ); and p occurs in δ. If {α, β} is inconsistent with respect to
`, then {α, β, δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p]. Suppose, then, that {α, β} is consistent with
respect to `. So Σ{α,β}C− is unital suitable for C
−, `, and {α, β}. By Identity
JUXTAPOSITION: A NEW WAY TO COMBINE LOGICS 27
and Weakening, {α, β} ` α and {α, β} ` β. By strong compatibility with `
and {α, β}, α ≡ β (mod Σ{α,β}C− ). So {α, β, δ[α/p]} `
∗ δ[β/p]. By Lemma 6.17,
{α, β, δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p]. Therefore, ` is left-extensional over Sent(C−, P ). 
Let BΣ12 be the Lindenbaum-Tarski class of juxtaposed structures for C1, C2,
and `12 built using the ΣΓCi relations. Combining Lemmas 6.18 and 6.21 with
Theorem 6.7, we arrive at the following result:
Proposition 6.22. Suppose `12 has no mere followers. Then:
1. `12 is strongly complete with respect to BΣ12;
2. If `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2, then `12 is strongly sound with
respect to BΣ12;
3. If `12 is consistent, then there is a coherent non-trivial model based on BΣ12;
4. BΣ12 is a class of juxtaposed unital structures just in case `12 is left-exten-
sional over Sent(C1, P1) and over Sent(C2, P2).
The following corollary is immediate:
Corollary 6.23. Suppose `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2, is consis-
tent, has no mere followers, and is left-extensional over Sent(C1, P1) and over
Sent(C2, P2). Then `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital determined.
Notice that the claim that `12 is left-extensional over Sent(Ci, Pi) is weaker
than the claim that `12 is Ci-left-extensional. Thus, this is a genuine strength-
ening of Corollary 6.16.
6.5. Necessary Conditions. Corollaries 6.13 and 6.23 provide sufficient
conditions on 〈C1, C2〉-strong determination and 〈C1, C2〉-strong unital deter-
mination, respectively. This raises the question of whether these conditions are
necessary, too. We can show that they are almost necessary. In particular,
non-triviality (and hence, consistency) is necessary for 〈C1, C2〉-strong determi-
nation. Left-extensionality over Sent(C1, P1) and over Sent(C2, P2) is necessary
for 〈C1, C2〉-strong unital determination. However, we cannot show that hav-
ing no mere followers is a necessary condition on 〈C1, C2〉-strong determination.
What we can show is that if C1 and C2 are disjoint, having no mere followers is
a necessary condition.43
Proposition 6.24. `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly sound only if `12 is non-trivial.
Proof. Suppose `12 is strongly sound with respect to B12, a class of juxta-
posed structures over C1 and C2 with a coherent non-trivial juxtaposed model
43We could modify our definitions so that having no mere followers is in general necessary
for 〈C1, C2〉-strong determination. One way to do so would be to say that `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-
strongly determined just in case `12 is strongly determined with respect to some class B12 of
juxtaposed structures over C1 and C2 such that (i) there is a non-trivial coherent juxtaposed
model based on B12; and (ii) if a sentence is invalid in B12, then there is a non-trivial coherent
juxtaposed model based on B12 that does not designate the sentence. (We would also have
to redefine 〈C1, C2〉-strong unital determination in the corresponding way.) This is a natural
proposal, since the analogue of condition (ii) is automatically satisfied in the case of ordinary
(non-juxtaposed) strong determination. Moreover, since our Lindenbaum-Tarski juxtaposed
models are non-trivial, the additional condition would not affect our proofs of 〈C1, C2〉-strong
determination and 〈C1, C2〉-strong unital determination. However, since this alternative defi-
nition is somewhat more complicated, we will stick with our original definition.
28 JOSHUA B. SCHECHTER
M12 based on it. Since M12 is non-trivial, for some α, β ∈ Sent(C12, P12),
M12  β and M12 2 α. So {β} 2B12 α. By soundness, {β} 012 α. So `12 is
non-trivial. 
It immediately follows that `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly sound only if `12 is con-
sistent.
Proposition 6.25. `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly complete with respect to a class
of juxtaposed unital structures only if `12 is left-extensional over Sent(C1, P1)
and over Sent(C2, P2).
Proof. Suppose `12 is strongly complete with respect to B12, a class of juxta-
posed unital structures over C1 and C2. Let i = 1 or 2. Suppose δ ∈ Sent(Ci, Pi)
and α, β ∈ Sent(C12, P12). Suppose M12 is a coherent juxtaposed unital model
over C1, C2, and P12 based on B12 such that M12  α, M12  β, and M12 
δ[α/p]. In M12, ‖α‖i = ‖β‖i = ‖δ[α/p]‖i = 1i. By induction on the com-
plexity of δ, ‖δ[β/p]‖i = ‖δ[α/p]‖i. So ‖δ[β/p]‖i = 1i. So M12  δ[β/p]. So
{α, β, δ[α/p]} B12 δ[β/p]. By strong completeness, {α, β, δ[α/p]} `12 δ[β/p].
Therefore, `12 is left-extensional over Sent(Ci, Pi). 
Proposition 6.26. Suppose C1 and C2 are disjoint. `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly
determined with respect to a class of juxtaposed structures only if `12 has no mere
followers.
Proof. Suppose `12 is strongly determined with respect to B12, a class of
juxtaposed structures over C1 and C2. Suppose 012 α. Let p be an element of
P12 that does not occur in α. We show that {p} 012 α.
By completeness, 2B12 α. So there is a coherent juxtaposed model M12 =
〈B1, V1,B2, V2〉 over C1, C2, and P12 based on B12 such that M12 2 α. Let each
Bi = 〈Bi, Di,Φi〉.
Let di be an element of Di and let ai be an element of Bi−Di. Let [ ]i be the
function from Sent(C12, P12) to Bi inductively defined as follows:
• If α has no occurrence of p, [α]i = ‖α‖M12i ;
• [p]i = di;
• If c ∈ Cni and p occurs in at least one of α1, . . . , αn, [cα1 . . . αn]i =
Φi(c)([α
1]i . . . [α
n]i);
• If c ∈ Cn1 and p occurs in at least one of α1, . . . , αn, [cα1 . . . αn]2 = d2 if
Φ1(c)([α
1]1 . . . [α
n]1) ∈ D1 and [cα1 . . . αn]2 = a2 otherwise;
• If c ∈ Cn2 and p occurs in at least one of α1, . . . , αn, [cα1 . . . αn]1 = d1 if
Φ2(c)([α
1]2 . . . [α
n]2) ∈ D2 and [cα1 . . . αn]1 = a1 otherwise.
Since C1 and C2 are disjoint, [ ]i is well-defined.
If α is an i-atom, let V ′i (α) = [α]i. Let M′12 = 〈B1, V ′1 ,B2, V ′2〉.
Clearly, M′12 is a juxtaposed model based on B12. It is straightforward to
show that in M′12, ‖α‖i = [α]i. It is also straightforward to show that M′12
is coherent. M′12  p and M′12 2 α. So {p} 2B12 α. By strong soundness,
{p} 012 α. 
Combining Corollaries 6.13 and 6.23 with Propositions 6.24, 6.25, and 6.26,
we arrive at the following nice result:
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Corollary 6.27. Suppose C1 and C2 are disjoint. Suppose `12 is the jux-
taposition of `1 and `2. Then:
1. `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly determined just in case `12 is consistent and has
no mere followers;
2. `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital determined just in case `12 is consistent,
has no mere followers, and is left-extensional over Sent(C1, P1) and over
Sent(C2, P2).
6.6. Juxtaposed Consequence Relations. Our main interest in this paper
concerns the combination of logics. A natural question to ask is: What properties
of `1 and `2 suffice for a juxtaposed consequence relation over `1 and `2 to
be 〈C1, C2〉-strongly determined or 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital determined? The
results above enable us to provide a fairly comprehensive answer to this question.
We first define a new notion. Suppose α ∈ Sent(C,P ). We say that an
occurrence of β in α is a maximal non-C−-occurrence just in case the main
connective of β is not from C− and the occurrence is not properly within the
scope of any connective not from C−.
Lemma 6.28. Suppose ` is C−-left-extensional. Then any consequence re-
lation that extends ` is C−-left-extensional.
Proof. Suppose C is a sub-signature of C+ and P is a subset of P+. Suppose
`+ is a consequence relation for Sent(C+, P+) that extends `. Suppose α, β, δ ∈
Sent(C+, P+) and p strictly C−-occurs in δ. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that δ ∈ Sent(C+, P ). (We can use Uniform Substitution to cover the
case where it doesn’t.) Let δ− be the result of replacing the maximal non-C−-
occurrences in δ with distinct elements of P that do not occur in α, β, or δ. Let q
and r be distinct elements of P that do not occur in δ−. So δ− ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p
strictly C−-occurs in δ. Since ` is C−-left-extensional, {q, r, δ−[q/p]} ` δ−[r/p].
Since `+ extends `, {q, r, δ−[q/p]} `+ δ−[r/p]. Since p strictly C−-occurs in δ, by
Uniform Substitution {q, r, δ[q/p]} `+ δ[r/p]. Again using Uniform Substitution,
{α, β, δ[α/p]} `+ δ[β/p]. Therefore, `+ is C−-left-extensional. 
Proposition 6.29. Suppose `12 is a juxtaposed consequence relation over
`1 and `2. Suppose at least one of `1 or `2 has theorems. Then:
1. `12 is strongly complete with respect to each of B=12, BΩ12, and BΣ12;
2. If `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2, then `12 is strongly sound with
respect to each of B=12, BΩ12, and BΣ12;
3. If `12 is consistent, then there are coherent non-trivial models based on each
of B=12, BΩ12, and BΣ12;
4. If `1 and `2 are each left-extensional, then BΩ12 and BΣ12 are classes of
juxtaposed unital structures.
Proof. If at least one of `1 and `2 has theorems, `12 has theorems, and
so `12 has no mere followers. Claims 1–3 then follow from Propositions 6.9,
6.12, and 6.22. If `i is left-extensional, then by Lemma 6.28, `12 is Ci-left-
extensional (and thus, is left-extensional over Sent(Ci, Pi)). Claim 4 then follows
from Propositions 6.15 and 6.22. 
The following corollary is immediate:
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Corollary 6.30. Suppose `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2. Suppose
`12 is consistent. Suppose at least one of `1 and `2 has theorems. Then:
1. `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly determined;
2. If `1 and `2 are each left-extensional, then `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital
determined.
In the case where C1 and C2 are disjoint, we have the following nice results:
Proposition 6.31. Suppose C1 and C2 are disjoint. Suppose `12 is the
juxtaposition of `1 and `2. Suppose each of `1 and `2 is consistent and has no
mere followers. Suppose at least one of `1 and `2 has theorems. Then:
1. `12 is strongly determined with respect to each of B=12, BΩ12, and BΣ12;
2. There is a coherent non-trivial model based on each of B=12, BΩ12, and BΣ12;
3. BΩ12 and BΣ12 are classes of juxtaposed unital structures just in case `1 and
`2 are each left-extensional.
Proof. By Theorem 5.10, `12 is consistent. If at least one of `1 and `2
has theorems, `12 has theorems, and so `12 has no mere followers. Claims
1–3 then follow from Propositions 6.9, 6.12, and 6.22 If `i is left-extensional,
then by Lemma 6.28, `12 is Ci-left-extensional (and thus, is left-extensional over
Sent(Ci, Pi)). By Theorem 5.11, if `12 is left-extensional over Sent(Ci, Pi), then
`i is left-extensional. Claim 4 then follows from Propositions 6.15 and 6.22. 
Corollary 6.32. Suppose C1 and C2 are disjoint. Suppose `12 is the jux-
taposition of `1 and `2. Suppose at least one of `1 and `2 has theorems. Then:
1. `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly determined just in case each of `1 and `2 is con-
sistent and has no mere followers;
2. `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital determined just in case each of `1 and `2 is
consistent, has no mere followers, and is left-extensional.
Proof. The right-to-left direction of each claim follows from Proposition 6.31.
The left-to-right direction follows from Propositions 6.24, 6.25, and 6.26 com-
bined with Theorem 5.11. 
Using Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, the following result is immediate:
Corollary 6.33. Suppose C1 and C2 are disjoint. Suppose `12 is the jux-
taposition of `1 and `2. Suppose at least one of `1 and `2 has theorems. Then:
1. `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly determined just in case each of `1 and `2 is strongly
determined;
2. `12 is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital determined just in case each of `1 and `2 is
strongly unital determined.
There is an additional result worth stating. We will make use of this result
in our discussion of classical and intuitionist logic below. We say that a class
of structures B is full for the consequence relation ` just in case ` is strongly
sound with respect to B and B contains at least one representative from every
isomorphism class of structures for ` that has a set of semantic values with
cardinality at most that of the language of `.44 We say that B is unital full for
44This is a weakening of Definition 4.4 in Zanardo et al. (2001) and Definition 3.3.11 in
Carnielli et al. (2008).
JUXTAPOSITION: A NEW WAY TO COMBINE LOGICS 31
the consequence relation ` just in case ` is strongly unital sound with respect
to B and B contains at least one representative from every isomorphism class of
unital structures for ` that has a set of semantic values with cardinality at most
that of the language of `.
Proposition 6.34. Suppose `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2 and B12 is
the juxtaposition of B1 and B2. Suppose at least one of `1 and `2 has theorems.
Then:
1. If B1 is full for `1 and B2 is full for `2, then `12 is strongly determined
with respect to B12;
2. If `1 and `2 are each left-extensional, B1 is unital full for `1, and B2 is
unital full for `2, then `12 is strongly determined with respect to B12, a
class of juxtaposed unital structures.
Proof. Since `1 is strongly sound with respect to B1 and `2 is strongly sound
with respect to B2, by Theorem 5.5, `12 is strongly sound with respect to B12.
Suppose B1 is full for `1 and B2 is full for `2. By Proposition 6.29, `12 is
strongly determined with respect to BΣ12. Using fullness, it is routine to show
that each element of BΣ12 is isomorphic to an element of B1×B2 = B12. Therefore,
`12 is strongly complete with respect to respect to B12.
Suppose B1 is unital full for `1 and B2 is unital full for `2. Since `1 and `2
are each left-extensional, by Proposition 6.29, `12 is strongly determined with
respect to BΣ12, a class of juxtaposed unital structures. Using fullness, it is again
routine to show that each element of BΣ12 is isomorphic to an element of B12.
So `12 is strongly complete with respect to respect to B12. Since B12 is the
juxtaposition of two classes of unital structures, it is a class of juxtaposed unital
structures. 
6.7. Equivalential Logics. There is an important special case worth dis-
cussing. It concerns logics that contain a set of formulas that behave like a
generalized biconditional.
Let q and r be distinct elements of P . Suppose Θ ⊆ Sent(C, {q, r}). For sim-
plicity, if θ ∈ Θ, we write θ(α, β) to stand for the result of uniformly substituting
each occurrence of q in θ with α and each occurrence of r in θ with β. We write
Θ(α, β) to stand for the set {θ(α, β) | θ ∈ Θ}. We write ` Θ(α, β) to abbreviate
the claim that for every θ ∈ Θ, ` θ(α, β). We write Γ ` Θ(α, β) to abbreviate
the claim that for every θ ∈ Θ, Γ ` θ(α, β).
We say that Θ is an equivalence set over C− for ` just in case Θ satisfies the
following conditions for every α, β, γ ∈ Sent(C,P ):
Reflexivity. ` Θ(α, α);
Symmetry. Θ(α, β) ` Θ(β, α);
Transitivity. Θ(α, β) ∪Θ(β, γ) ` Θ(α, γ);
Modus Ponens. {α} ∪Θ(α, β) ` β;
Congruence over C−. For every c− ∈ C−n, α1, . . . , αn, β ∈ Sent(C,P ),
and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Θ(αk, β) ` Θ(c−α1 . . . αk . . . αn, c−α1 . . . β . . . αn).
There is an additional condition worth stating:
Substitution over C−. For every δ ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p that strictly C−-
occurs in δ, {δ[α/p]} ∪Θ(α, β) ` δ[β/p].
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Proposition 6.35. Suppose Θ satisfies Reflexivity and Congruence over
C−. Then Θ satisfies Substitution over C− just in case Θ satisfies Modus Po-
nens.
Proof. Suppose Θ satisfies Modus Ponens. Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p
strictly C−-occurs in δ. Using Reflexivity and Congruence over C−, by induction
on the complexity of δ, Θ(α, β) ` Θ(δ[α/p], δ[β/p]). By Modus Ponens and Cut,
{δ[α/p]} ∪Θ(α, β) ` δ[β/p].
Now suppose Θ satisfies Substitution over C−. So {p[α/p]}∪Θ(α, β) ` p[β/p].
That is, {α} ∪Θ(α, β) ` β. 
We say that Θ is a regular equivalence set over C− for ` just in case Θ is an
equivalence set over C− for ` that satisfies the following additional condition:
Regularity. {α, β} ` Θ(α, β).
We say that Θ is an equivalence set for ` just in case Θ is an equivalence set
over C for `. We say that Θ is a regular equivalence set for ` just in case Θ
is a regular equivalence set over C for `. In many familiar logics – including
classical and intuitionist logic – the sets {q ↔ r} and {q → r, r → q} are regular
equivalence sets.
We say that ` is equivalential over C− if there is an equivalence set over C− for
`. We say that ` is regularly equivalential over C− if there is a regular equivalence
set over C− for `. We say that ` is equivalential (simpliciter) just in case ` is
equivalential over C. We say that ` is regularly equivalential (simpliciter) just
in case ` is regularly equivalential over C.45
It is straightforward to show that if ` is regularly equivalential over C−, then
` is C−-left-extensional (and is therefore left-extensional over Sent(C−, P )).
Proposition 6.36. If ` is regularly equivalential over C−, then ` is C−-
left-extensional.
Proof. Suppose Θ is a regular equivalence set over C− for `. Suppose
δ ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p strictly C−-occurs in δ. By Proposition 6.35, {δ[α/p]} ∪
Θ(α, β) ` δ[β/p]. By Regularity, {α, β} ` Θ(α, β). By Cut, {α, β, δ[α/p]} `
δ[β/p]. Therefore, ` is C−-left-extensional. 
Equivalence sets over C− provide simple ways to construct equivalence re-
lations suitable for C−, `, and Γ. Suppose Θ ⊆ Sent(C,P ) is an equivalence
set over C− for `. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ). We define a binary relation on
Sent(C,P ) as follows:
〈α, β〉 ∈ ΘΓ just in case Γ ` Θ(α, β).
We write α ≡ β (mod ΘΓ) to stand for the claim that 〈α, β〉 ∈ ΘΓ.
Lemma 6.37. Suppose Θ is an equivalence set over C− for `. Then for
every Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ), ΘΓ is an equivalence relation on Sent(C,P ) suitable for
C−, `, and Γ.
45The notion of an equivalential logic (simpliciter) is originally due to Prucnal & Wroński
(1974). See Czelakowski (1981) for discussion.
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Proof. Suppose Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ). By Reflexivity, Symmetry, Transitivity,
Weakening, and Cut, ΘΓ is an equivalence relation on Sent(C,P ).
Congruence over C−: Suppose c− ∈ C−n; α1, . . . , αn, β ∈ Sent(C,P ); and
k ∈ {1, . . . n}. Suppose αk ≡ β (mod ΘΓ). So Γ ` Θ(αk, β). Since Θ sat-
isfies Congruence over C−, Θ(αk, β) ` Θ(c−α1 . . . αk . . . αn, c−α1 . . . β . . . αn).
By Cut, Γ ` Θ(c−α1 . . . αk . . . αn, c−α1 . . . β . . . αn). Hence, c−α1 . . . αk . . . αn ≡
c−α1 . . . β . . . αn (mod ΘΓ).
Compatibility with Γ and `: Suppose α ≡ β (mod ΘΓ). So Γ ` Θ(α, β).
Suppose Γ ` α. By Modus Ponens, {α}∪Θ(α, β) ` β. By Cut, Γ ` β. Similarly,
if Γ ` β, then Γ ` α. So Γ ` α just in case Γ ` β. 
Lemma 6.38. Suppose Θ is an equivalence set over C− for `. Then Θ
is a regular equivalence set over C− for ` just in case for every non-empty
Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ) consistent with `, ΘΓ is unital suitable for C−, `, and Γ.
Proof. Suppose Θ is a regular equivalence set over C− for `. Suppose Γ ⊆
Sent(C,P ). Suppose Γ ` α and Γ ` β. By Regularity, {α, β} ` Θ(α, β). By
Cut, Γ ` Θ(α, β). So α ≡ β (mod ΘΓ). Therefore, ΘΓ is unital suitable for C−,
`, and Γ.
Now suppose for every non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C,P ) consistent with `, ΘΓ is
unital suitable for C−, `, and Γ. Suppose α, β ∈ Sent(C,P ). If {α, β} is
inconsistent with respect to `, {α, β} ` Θ(α, β). Suppose, then, that {α, β} is
consistent with respect to `. So Θ{α,β} is unital suitable for C−, `, and {α, β}.
By Identity and Weakening, {α, β} ` α and {α, β} ` β. By strong compatibility
with ` and {α, β}, α ≡ β (mod Θ{α,β}). So, again, {α, β} ` Θ(α, β). Therefore,
Θ is a regular equivalence set over C− for `. 
Suppose Θ1 is an equivalence set over C1 for `12 and Θ2 is an equivalence
set over C2 for `12. Let B〈Θ1,Θ2〉12 be the Lindenbaum-Tarski class of juxtaposed
structures for C1, C2, and `12 built using the ΘΓi relations. Any consequence
relation that is equivalential over some signature has theorems. Combining this
fact with Lemmas 6.37 and 6.38 and Theorem 6.7, we arrive at the following
result:
Proposition 6.39. Suppose Θ1 is an equivalence set over C1 for `12 and
Θ2 is an equivalence set over C2 for `12. Then:
1. `12 is strongly complete with respect to B〈Θ1,Θ2〉12 ;
2. If `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2, then `12 is strongly sound with
respect to B〈Θ1,Θ2〉12 ;
3. If `12 is consistent, then there is a coherent non-trivial model based on
B〈Θ1,Θ2〉12 ;
4. B〈Θ1,Θ2〉12 is a class of juxtaposed unital structures just in case Θ1 is a regular
equivalence set over C1 for `12 and Θ2 is a regular equivalence set over C2
for `12.
There is a particularly well-behaved kind of equivalence set over C−. We say
that Θ is an internal equivalence set over C− for ` just in case Θ is an equivalence
set over C− for ` and Θ ⊆ Sent(C−, {q, r}). We say that Θ is an regular internal
equivalence set if, in addition, Θ satisfies the Regularity condition. We say that
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` is internally equivalential over C− if there is an internal equivalence set over
C− for `. We say that ` is regularly internally equivalential over C− if there is
a regular internal equivalence set over C− for `. Notice that ` is equivalential
(simpliciter) just in case ` is internally equivalential over C. ` is regularly
equivalential (simpliciter) just in case ` is regularly internally equivalential over
C.
We first put forward two alternative ways to characterize internal equivalence
sets over C−.
Proposition 6.40. Suppose Θ ⊆ Sent(C−, {q, r}). Θ is an internal equiv-
alence set over C− for ` just in case Θ satisfies Reflexivity, Modus Ponens, and
Congruence over C−.
Proof. Suppose Θ satisfies Reflexivity, Modus Ponens, and Congruence over
C−. Suppose θ ∈ Θ.
Symmetry: Since Θ is an internal equivalence set over C− for `, p strictly C−-
occurs in θ(p, α). So by Proposition 6.35, {θ(p, α)[α/p]}∪Θ(α, β) ` θ(p, α)[β/p].
That is, {θ(α, α)} ∪ Θ(α, β) ` θ(β, α). By Reflexivity, ` θ(α, α). By Cut,
Θ(α, β) ` θ(β, α).
Transitivity: Since Θ is an internal equivalence set over C− for `, p strictly
C−-occurs in θ(α, p). By Proposition 6.35, {θ(α, p)[β/p]}∪Θ(β, γ) ` θ(α, p)[γ/p].
That is, θ(α, β) ∪Θ(β, γ) ` θ(α, γ)). 
Proposition 6.41. Suppose Θ ⊆ Sent(C−, {q, r}). Θ is an internal equiva-
lence set over C− for ` just in case Θ satisfies Reflexivity and Substitution over
C−.
Proof. Suppose Θ is an internal equivalence set over C− for `. Θ satisfies
Reflexivity. By Proposition 6.35, Θ satisfies Substitution over C−.
Now suppose Θ satisfies Reflexivity and Substitution over C−. Suppose c− ∈
C−n; α1, . . . , αn, β ∈ Sent(C,P ); p is an element of P that does not occur in
α1, . . . , αn; and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Suppose θ ∈ Θ. Since θ ∈ Sent(C−, {q, r}),
p strictly C−-occurs in θ(c−α1 . . . αk . . . αn, c−α1 . . . p . . . αn). By Substitution
over C−, Reflexivity, and Cut, Θ(αk, β) ` θ(c−α1 . . . αk . . . αn, c−α1 . . . β . . . αn).
So Θ satisfies Congruence over C−. By Proposition 6.35, Θ satisfies Modus
Ponens. By Proposition 6.40, Θ satisfies Symmetry and Transitivity. Therefore,
Θ is an internal equivalence set over C− for `. 
We next show that any two internal equivalence sets over C− for ` are inter-
derivable:
Proposition 6.42. Suppose Θ and Θ′ are both internal equivalence sets
over C− for `. Then Θ(α, β) ` Θ′(α, β).
Proof. Suppose θ′ ∈ Θ′. Since Θ′ is an internal equivalence set over C− for `,
p strictly C−-occurs in θ′(α, p). By Proposition 6.35, {θ′(α, p)[α/p]}∪Θ(α, β) `
θ′(α, p)[β/p]. That is, {θ′(α, α)} ∪Θ(α, β) ` θ′(α, β). By Reflexivity, ` θ′(α, α).
By Cut, Θ(α, β) ` θ′(α, β). 
It follows from this result that if Θ and Θ′ are both internal equivalence sets
over C− for `, then ΘΓ = Θ′Γ. (It also follows that if Θ is regular, so is Θ′.
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Indeed, it is straightforward to show that if ` is internally equivalential and
regularly equivalential, then every internal equivalence relation is regular.)
Suppose ` is internally equivalential over C−. Let ΘΓC− stand for the unique
equivalence relation defined on Sent(C,P ) generated by any of the internal equiv-




C− is the most
coarse-grained equivalence relation on Sent(C,P ) suitable for C−, `, and Γ.
Lemma 6.43.
1. If Θ is an equivalence set over C− for `, then Θ is an equivalence set over
C− for any consequence relation that extends `;
2. If Θ is a regular equivalence set over C− for `, then Θ is a regular equiva-
lence set over C− for any consequence relation that extends `.
Proof. Suppose C is a sub-signature of C+ and P is a subset of P+. Suppose
`+ is a consequence relation for Sent(C+, P+) that extends `. Suppose p, q, and
r are distinct elements of P . Suppose α, β, γ ∈ Sent(C+, P+).
Reflexivity: ` Θ(p, p). So `+ Θ(p, p). By Uniform Substitution, `+ (α, α).
Symmetry: Θ(p, q) ` Θ(q, p). So Θ(p, q) `+ Θ(q, p). By Uniform Substitution,
Θ(α, β) `+ Θ(β, α).
Transitivity: Θ(p, q) ∪ Θ(q, r) ` Θ(p, r). So Θ(p, q) ∪ Θ(q, r) `+ Θ(p, r). By
Uniform Substitution, Θ(α, β) ∪Θ(β, γ) `+ Θ(α, γ).
Modus Ponens: {p} ∪Θ(p, q) ` q. So {p} ∪Θ(p, q) `+ q. By Uniform Substi-
tution, {α} ∪Θ(α, β) `+ β.
Congruence over C−: Let c− ∈ C−n. Let p1, . . . pn, q be distinct elements
of P . Let α1, . . . , αn, β ∈ Sent(C+, P+) and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Θ(pk, q) `
Θ(c−p1 . . . pk . . . pn, c−p1 . . . q . . . pn). So Θ(pk, q) `+ Θ(c−p1 . . . pk . . . pn,
c−p1 . . . q . . . pn). By Uniform Substitution, Θ(αk, β) `+ Θ(c−α1 . . . αk . . . αn,
c−α1 . . . β . . . αn).
Regularity: By Regularity, {p, q} ` Θ(p, q). So {p, q} `+ Θ(p, q). By Uniform
Substitution, {α, β} ` Θ(α, β). 
Proposition 6.44. Suppose ` is internally equivalential over C−. Suppose




C− is the most coarse-grained equiva-
lence relation over Sent(C,P ) suitable for C−, `, and Γ.
Proof. Suppose Θ is an internal equivalence set over C− for `.
We first show that α ≡ β (mod ΘΓC−) just in case α ≡ β (mod Ω
Γ
C−).
Suppose α ≡ β (mod ΘΓC−). By Proposition 6.11, α ≡ β (mod Ω
Γ
C−).
Now suppose α ≡ β (mod ΩΓC−). Suppose θ ∈ Θ. Let p be an element of P
that does not occur in α. Since Θ is an internal equivalence set over C− for `, p
strictly C−-occurs in θ(α, p). So Γ ` Θ(α, p)[α/p] just in case Γ ` Θ(α, p)[β/p].
That is, Γ ` Θ(α, α) just in case Γ ` Θ(α, β). By Reflexivity and Weakening,
Γ ` Θ(α, α). So Γ ` Θ(α, β). Therefore, α ≡ β (mod ΘΓC−).
We next show that α ≡ β (mod ΘΓC−) just in case α ≡ β (mod Σ
Θ
C−).
Suppose α ≡ β (mod ΘΓC−). So Γ ` Θ(α, β). Suppose δ ∈ Sent(C
−, P ∪ P ∗)
and p occurs in δ. By Lemma 6.43, Θ is an equivalence set over C− for `∗. By
Proposition 6.35, {δ[α/p]}∪Θ(α, β) `∗ δ[β/p]. Since `∗ extends `, Γ `∗ Θ(α, β).
By Cut, Γ ∪ {δ[α/p]} `∗ δ[β/p]. Moreover, by Symmetry, Γ `∗ Θ(β, α). So by
analogous reasoning, Γ ∪ {δ[β/p]} `∗ δ[α/p]. Therefore, α ≡ β (mod ΣΓC−).
36 JOSHUA B. SCHECHTER
Now suppose α ≡ β (mod ΣΓC−). Suppose θ ∈ Θ and p ∈ P
∗. Since Θ is
an internal equivalence set over C− for `, Γ ∪ θ(p, α) `∗ θ(p, β). By Uniform
Substitution, Γ ∪ θ(α, α) `∗ θ(α, β). By Lemma 6.17, Γ ∪ θ(α, α) ` θ(α, β). By
Reflexivity, ` θ(α, α). By Cut, Γ ` θ(α, β). Therefore, α ≡ β (mod ΘΓC−).
By Proposition 6.11, ΩΓC− is the most coarse-grained equivalence relation on
Sent(C,P ) suitable for C−, `, and Γ. 
Suppose `12 is internally equivalential over C1 and over C2. Let BΘ12 be the
Lindenbaum-Tarski class of juxtaposed structures for C1, C2, and `12, built
using the ΘΓCi relations.
Proposition 6.45. Suppose `12 is internally equivalential over C1 and over
C2. Then:
1. BΘ12 = BΩ12 = BΣ12;
2. BΘ12 is a class of juxtaposed unital structures just in case `12 is regularly in-
ternally equivalential over C1 and over C2 just in case `12 is left-extensional
over Sent(C1, P1) and over Sent(C2, P2).
Proof. Claim 1 follows from Proposition 6.44 Claim 2 follows from Proposi-
tion 6.44 and Lemmas 6.14 and 6.21. 
Since BΘ12 = BΩ12 = BΣ12, it is natural to think of this class as the canonical
Lindenbaum-Tarski class of juxtaposed structures for C1, C2, and `12.
Suppose each of `1 and `2 is equivalential. When is `12 〈C1, C2〉-strongly
determined or 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital determined? Our results provide a fairly
comprehensive answer to this question.
Proposition 6.46. Suppose `12 is a juxtaposed consequence relation over
`1 and `2. Suppose each of `1 and `2 is equivalential. Then:
1. `12 is strongly complete with respect to BΘ12;
2. If `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2, then `12 is strongly sound with
respect to BΘ12;
3. If `12 is consistent, then there is a coherent non-trivial model based on BΘ12;
4. If each of `1 and `2 is regularly equivalential then BΘ12 is a class of juxta-
posed unital structures.
Proof. By Lemma 6.43, if `i is equivalential, then `12 is internally equiv-
alential over Ci. By Proposition 6.42, BΘ12 is well-defined. Claims 1–4 then follow
by Proposition 6.39. 
Proposition 6.47. Suppose C1 and C2 are disjoint. Suppose `12 is a jux-
taposed consequence relation over `1 and `2. Suppose each of `1 and `2 is
consistent and equivalential. Then:
1. `12 is strongly complete with respect to BΘ12;
2. If `12 is the juxtaposition of `1 and `2, then `12 is strongly sound with
respect to BΘ12;
3. There is a coherent non-trivial model based on BΘ12;
4. BΘ12 is a class of juxtaposed unital structures just in case each of `1 and `2
is regularly equivalential.
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Proof. If `1 and `2 are consistent, then by Theorem 5.10, `12 is consistent.
Claims 1–3 then follow from Proposition 6.46. Claim 4 follows from Proposition
6.39 and Theorem 5.11. 
§7. Classical and Intuitionist Logics. In this section, we make use of our
general results about juxtaposition to investigate cases of particular interest –
juxtapositions of classical and intuitionist logics.
Let P1 = P2 = P12 be the countably infinite set {p1, p2, . . . }. For i = 1 and 2,
let the signature Ci contain the following sets of connectives:
• C1i = {¬i}.
• C2i = {∧i,∨i,→i,↔i}.
C12 thus contains two copies of each of the standard propositional connectives.
We say that a consequence relation, `12, for Sent(C12, P12) collapses just in
case for every δ, δ′ ∈ Sent(C12, P12) exactly alike except perhaps for some or all
of their subscripts, {δ} `12 δ′.46
Let `c1 be the classical consequence relation for Sent(C1, P1). Let `i1 be the
intuitionist consequence relation for Sent(C1, P1). Let `c2 and `i2 be defined
similarly.
Let `cc be the juxtaposition of `c1 and `c2. We call this the “bi-classical”
consequence relation for Sent(C12, P12). Let `ii be the juxtaposition of `i1 and
`i2. We call this the “bi-intuitionist” consequence relation for Sent(C12, P12).
Finally, let `ic be the juxtaposition of `i1 and `c2. We call this the “intuitionist-
classical” consequence relation for Sent(C12, P12).
7.1. Applying the Results. Let us first consider the case of bi-classical
logic, the juxtaposition of two classical consequence relations. Applying the
results above, we can derive several properties of `cc.
Given any non-trivial Boolean algebra, 〈B,≤〉, there is a corresponding unital
structure 〈B, {1},Φ〉 where B is the same set of semantic values, 1 is the greatest
element of the Boolean algebra, and for every a, b ∈ B:
Φ(¬)(a) = −a;
Φ(∧)(a, b) = a u b;
Φ(∨)(a, b) = a t b;
Φ(→)(a, b) = −a t b;
Φ(↔)(a, b) = (−a t b) u (−b t a).
Here, −, u, and t are the complement, infimum, and supremum relations on the
Boolean algebra, respectively.
Let us call such structures “Boolean structures”. Given a Boolean structure,
the partial order of the corresponding Boolean algebra can be recovered: a ≤ b
just in case Φ(→)(a, b) = 1.
46In the literature on fibring, the term “collapse” is typically used for the property called
“weak collapse” in section 7.4 below.
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The classical consequence relation is strongly determined with respect to the
class of Boolean structures.47 It is consistent, has theorems, and is left-extensional.
By Theorem 5.10, `cc is consistent. By Theorem 5.11, `cc is strongly conserva-
tive over `c1 and `c2. It can be axiomatized using two copies of any Hilbert-style
axiomatization for classical logic. (It can also be axiomatized using two copies
of any natural deduction-style axiomatization for classical logic restricted so
that the rules for one stock of connectives cannot be applied within any sub-
derivation used in the application of a meta-rule governing a connective from
the other stock.) By Corollary 6.32, `cc is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital determined.
We can extract additional information about `cc using Proposition 6.34. The
class of all Boolean structures is unital full for the classical consequence relation.
We say that a juxtaposed unital structure 〈B1,B2〉 is a bi-Boolean structure just
in case both B1 and B2 are Boolean structures. By Proposition 6.34, `cc is
strongly determined with respect to the class of all bi-Boolean structures.
The case of the bi-intuitionist consequence relation, `ii is analogous. Given
any non-trivial Heyting algebra, 〈B,≤〉, there is a corresponding unital structure
〈B, {1},Φ〉 where B is the same set of semantic values, 1 is the greatest element
of the Heyting algebra, and for every a, b ∈ B:
Φ(¬)(a) = a⇒ 0;
Φ(∧)(a, b) = a u b;
Φ(∨)(a, b) = a t b;
Φ(→)(a, b) = a⇒ b;
Φ(↔)(a, b) = (a⇒ b) u (b⇒ a).
Here, u, t, and ⇒, are the infimum, supremum, and implication relations on
the Heyting algebra, and 0 is its least element.
Let us call such structures “Heyting structures”. Given a Heyting structure,
the partial order of the corresponding Heyting algebra can be recovered: a ≤ b
just in case Φ(→)(a, b) = 1.
The intuitionist consequence relation is strongly determined with respect to
the class of Heyting structures.48 It is consistent, has theorems, and is left-
extensional. By Theorem 5.10, `ii is consistent. By Theorem 5.11, `ii is strongly
conservative over `i1 and `i2. It can be axiomatized using two copies of any
Hilbert-style axiomatization for intuitionist logic. (It can also be axiomatized
using two copies of any natural deduction-style axiomatization for intuitionist
logic restricted so that the rules for one stock of connectives cannot be applied
within any sub-derivation used in the application of a meta-rule governing a
connective from the other stock.) By Corollary 6.32, `ii is 〈C1, C2〉-strongly
unital determined.
47The classical consequence relation is also strongly determined with respect to the class of
structures defined as above except that the set of designated values is allowed to be any proper
filter on the Boolean algebra.
48The intuitionist consequence relation is also strongly determined with respect to the class
of structures defined as above except that the set of designated values is allowed to be any
proper filter on the Heyting algebra.
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The class of all Heyting structures is unital full for the intuitionist consequence
relation. We say that a juxtaposed unital structure 〈B1,B2〉 is a bi-Heyting struc-
ture just in case both B1 and B2 are Heyting structures. By Proposition 6.34,
`ii is strongly determined with respect to the class of all bi-Heyting structures.
Finally, consider the intuitionist-classical consequence relation, `ic. By The-
orem 5.10, `ic is consistent. By Theorem 5.11, `ic is strongly conservative over
`i1 and `c2. It can be axiomatized by combining a Hilbert-style axiomatization
for classical logic and a Hilbert-style axiomatization for intuitionist logic. (It can
also be axiomatized using a copy of any natural deduction-style axiomatization
for intuitionist logic and a copy of any natural deduction-style axiomatization
for classical logic, each restricted so that the rules for one stock of connectives
cannot be applied within any sub-derivation used in the application of a meta-
rule governing a connective from the other stock.) By Corollary 6.32, `ic is
〈C1, C2〉-strongly unital determined.
We say that a juxtaposed unital structure 〈B1,B2〉 is a Heyting-Boolean struc-
ture just in case B1 is a Heyting structure and B2 is a Boolean structure. Again
using Proposition 6.34, `ic is strongly determined with respect to the class of all
Heyting-Boolean structures.
7.2. Non-Collapse Results. These results already have implications for the
collapse of classical and intuitionist logics. Consider the case of `ic. We have
shown that this consequence relation is strongly conservative over `i1 and `c2.
This suffices to show that `ic does not collapse.49 Since p ∨ ¬p is a theorem of
classical logic but not a theorem of intuitionist logic, 0ic p∨1¬1p and `ic p∨2¬2p.
Similarly, Peirce’s law, ((p→ q)→ p)→ p, can be used to show that→1 and→2
are not intersubstitutable. Double Negation Elimination can be used to show
that ¬1 and ¬2 are not intersubstitutable, either.
The interest of these results should not be underemphasized. Juxtaposition
is a natural way to combine classical and intuitionist logic. `ic has all of the
entailments of intuitionist logic (for the 1-connectives) and all of the entailments
of classical logic (for the 2-connectives). Indeed, it is a strong conservative
extension of both intuitionist and classical logic. It obeys the usual structural
rules, and is substitution invariant. Yet, the classical and intuitionist connectives
are not intersubstitutable. There is no collapse.
Notice that the non-collapse result also applies to `ii. This is a strictly weaker
relation than `ic. Thus, if corresponding connectives are not intersubstitutable
in `ic, they are not intersubstitutable in `ii, either.
What about bi-classical logic? Does this logic avoid collapse? The answer is
yes, but proving this takes a bit more work. In particular, to show that `cc does
not collapse, we make use of Lemma 5.1 to build a coherent bi-Boolean model.
A Boolean model can be specified by specifying a Boolean algebra and a valu-
ation. Boolean algebras can be visually represented using Hasse diagrams. Such
a diagram contains nodes – each representing a distinct element of the carrier
set of the algebra – and line segments connecting pairs of nodes. Given two
elements of the carrier set, a and b, a ≤ b just in case there is a path from a to
49This can also be proved using the technique of cryptofibring. See Caleiro & Ramos (2007).
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b monotonically increasing in height. For example, here are the Hasse diagrams







Let B1 be the Boolean structure corresponding to the first of these Boolean




3) = 01. Let V2(p
1) = V2(p
2) = e and
V2(p
3) = f. Let Vi(p) = 1i for every other p ∈ P12. Let M1 = 〈B1, V1〉 and
M2 = 〈B2, V2〉. M1 and M2 designate the very same sentence symbols. By
Lemma 5.1, there is a coherent juxtaposition of M1 and M2. We can single
out a specific coherent juxtaposition of these models by specifying which non-
designated elements to use in the construction relied upon in the proof of that
lemma. (Since B1 and B2 are unital, there is no choice about which designated
elements to use in the construction.) In particular, let a1 = 01 and a2 = 02.
Let M∗12 be the coherent bi-Boolean model that results from this choice in the
construction.
Using this juxtaposed model, we can prove the non-collapse result. Indeed,
we can prove the stronger result that no two corresponding connectives in C12
are intersubstitutable according to `cc:
Proposition 7.1. In `cc, no pair of corresponding connectives are inter-
substitutable. In particular:
• {¬1p} 0cc ¬2p;
• {p ∨1 q} 0cc p ∨2 q;
• {p→1 q} 0cc p→2 q;
• {p↔1 q} 0cc p↔2 q;
• {¬2(p ∧1 q)} 0cc ¬2(p ∧2 q).
Therefore, `cc does not collapse.
Proof. Since `cc is strongly sound with respect to the class of bi-Boolean
structures, all we have to do is to find a coherent bi-Boolean countermodel to
each putative entailment claim. We make use of the model M∗12,
InM∗12, ‖¬1p1‖1 = 11 and ‖¬2p1‖2 = f. So {¬1p1} 0cc ¬2p1. ‖p1 ∨2 p3‖2 = 12
and ‖p1 ∨1 p3‖1 = 01. So {p1 ∨2 p3} 0cc p1 ∨1 p3. By symmetry, {p1 ∨1 p3} 0cc
p1 ∨2 p3. ‖p1 →1 p3‖1 = 11 and ‖p1 →2 p3‖2 = f. So {p1 →1 p3} 0cc p1 →2 p3.
‖p1 ↔1 p3‖1 = 11. ‖p1 ↔2 p3‖2 = 02. So {p1 ↔1 p3} 0cc p1 ↔2 p3.
The trickiest case is the final one, since it involves an embedded connective.
This is what requires us to specify a particular coherent juxtaposition ofM1 and
M2. InM∗12, ‖¬2(p1 ∧1 p2)‖2 = −2‖p1 ∧1 p2‖2 = −202 = 12. ‖¬2(p1 ∧2 p2)‖2 =
f. So {¬2(p1 ∧1 p3)} 0cc ¬2(p1 ∧2 p3). 
Since `ii and `ic are weaker than `cc, the result applies to these logics, as
well.
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Notice that the two conjunction connectives, ∧1 and ∧2, are intersubstitutable
as main connectives in `ii. This is because {p1∧1p2} `i1 p1, {p1∧1p2} `i1 p2, and
{p1, p2} `i2 p1 ∧2 p2. By the definition of juxtaposition, {p1 ∧1 p2} `ii p1 ∧2 p2.
By Uniform Substitution, {α∧1 β} `ii α∧2 β. The other direction is analogous.
It follows that ∧1 and ∧2, are intersubstitutable as main connectives in stronger
logics, including `cc and `ic.
It is also worth noting that, as advertised above, `cc is not left-extensional.
Proposition 7.2. `cc is not left-extensional.
Proof. Let B1 and B2 be the Boolean structures defined above. Let V1(p1) =
V1(p
2) = 11. Let V2(p
1) = V2(p
2) = 12 Let Vi(p) = 0i for every other p ∈ P12.
Let M1 = 〈B1, V1〉 and M2 = 〈B2, V2〉. By Lemma 5.1, there is a coherent
juxtaposition of M1 and M2. Using a simple modification of the construction
appearing in the proof of that lemma, we can ensure that ‖¬1p1‖2 = 02 and
‖¬1p2‖2 = e. (We let a2 vary as needed in the construction.)
In the resulting model, ‖¬2¬1p1‖2 = 12 and ‖¬2¬1p2‖2 = f. By strong sound-
ness, {p1, p2,¬2¬1p1} 0cc ¬2¬1p2. 
It follows that `ii and `ic are not left-extensional, either.
7.3. Interaction Rules. Our non-collapse results raise a question: Which
additional axioms and rules lead to collapse when added to `ii, `ic, or `cc? In
particular, which interaction rules – rules involving both stocks of connectives –
lead to collapse?
Our general results about juxtaposition can help us to tackle this question.
Many of our results do not merely to apply to the juxtaposition of `1 and `2, but
to any juxtaposed consequence relation over `1 and `2 (so long as the relevant
constraints are met). Thus, we can make use of these results to help determine
whether a juxtaposed consequence relation collapses. For example, we have the
following nice result:
Proposition 7.3. Suppose `12 is a consequence relation for Sent(C12, P12)
that extends `ii. Suppose for any α, β ∈ Sent(C12, P12), {α →1 β} `12 α →2 β
and {α→2 β} `12 α→1 β. Then `12 collapses.
Proof. {q → r, r → q} is a regular equivalence set for intuitionist logic. By
Lemma 6.43, {q →i r, r →i q} is a regular internal equivalence set over Ci for `12.
For any i ∈ {1, 2} and non-empty Γ ⊆ Sent(C12, P12) consistent with respect to
`12, let 〈α, β〉 ∈ ΘΓC1 just in case Γ `12 α →i β and Γ `12 β →i α. By Lemma
6.38, ΘΓCi is unital suitable for Ci, `12 and Γ. Let M
Γ
12 = 〈BΓ1 ,VΓ1 ,BΓ2 ,VΓ2 〉
















1 (p) = V
Γ
2 (p) for every p ∈ P12, and
|α|1 = |α|2 for every α ∈ Sent(C12, P12). By Lemma 6.2, ‖α‖1 = ‖α‖2 for every
α ∈ Sent(C12, P12).
The partial order of the Heyting algebra corresponding to BΓi , ≤Γi , can be
defined as follows: |α|Γi ≤Γi |β|
Γ






i ) = 1
Γ
i just in case
Γ `12 α→i β. By Cut, Γ `12 α→1 β just in case Γ `12 α→2 β. Thus, ≤Γ1 =≤Γ2 .
As described above, ΦΓi assigns to the connectives in Ci the functions induced by
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≤Γi to make BΓ12 into a Heyting structure. Hence, ΦΓ1 and ΦΓ2 map corresponding
connectives to the very same functions. It follows that any two sentences that
are exactly alike except for their subscripts will have the same i-values in MΓ12.
Let δ, δ′ ∈ Sent(C12, P12) be sentences that are exactly alike except for some
or all of their subscripts. If {δ} is inconsistent with respect to `12, {δ} `12
δ′. Suppose, then, that {δ} is consistent with respect to `12. By Lemma 6.2,
M
{δ}
12  δ. By the above reasoning, δ and δ






′. Again using Lemma 6.2, {δ} `12 δ′. Therefore, `12 collapses. 
Thus, if we enrich `ii (or a stronger logic) with the rule that says that →1
and →2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives, the resulting logic collapses.
We can leverage this result to get further collapse results. In intuitionist logic,
α → β is equivalent to α ↔ (α ∧ β). So it follows that if we enrich `ii (or a
stronger logic) with (i) the rule that says that↔1 and↔2 are intersubstitutable
as main connectives as well as (ii) the rule that says that ∧1 and ∧2 are intersub-
stitutable in general, the resulting logic collapses. In intuitionist logic, α→ β is
also equivalent to β ↔ (α ∨ β). So if we enrich `ii (or a stronger logic) with (i)
the rule that says that↔1 and↔2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives as
well as (ii) the rule that says that ∨1 and ∨2 are intersubstitutable in general,
the resulting logic collapses.
We can prove additional collapse results for enrichments of bi-classical logic.
For example:
Proposition 7.4. Suppose `12 is a consequence relation for Sent(C12, P12)
that extends `cc. Suppose for any α, β ∈ Sent(C12, P12), {α∨1 β} `12 α∨2 β and
{α ∨2 β} `12 α ∨1 β. Then `12 collapses.
Proof. {α →1 β} `cc ¬2α ∨1 (α →1 β). {¬2α ∨1 α,¬2α ∨1 (α →1 β)} `cc
¬2α ∨1 β. `cc ¬2α ∨2 α and {¬2α ∨2 α} `12 ¬2α ∨1 α. By Cut, {α →1 β} `12
¬2α ∨1 β. {¬2α ∨1 β} `12 ¬2α ∨2 β. {¬2α ∨2 β} `cc α →2 β. By Cut,
{α →1 β} `12 α →2 β. Similarly, {α →2 β} `12 α →1 β. By Proposition 7.3,
`12 collapses. 
Thus, if we enrich `cc (or a stronger logic) with the rule that says that ∨1 and
∨2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives, the resulting logic collapses.
In classical logic, α→ β is equivalent to ¬(α ∧ ¬β). So if we enrich `cc (or a
stronger logic) with (i) the rule that says that ¬1 and ¬2 are intersubstitutable
in general as well as (ii) the rule that says that ∧1 and ∧2 are intersubstitutable
in general, the resulting logic collapses.
We can also prove non-collapse results for enriched logics. For example:
Proposition 7.5. Suppose `12 is the least consequence relation that extends
`cc such that for any α, β ∈ Sent(C12, P12), (i) {¬1α} `12 ¬2α and {¬2α} `12
¬1α; and (ii) {α ↔1 β} `12 α ↔2 β and {α ↔2 β} `12 α ↔1 β. Then in `12,
no pair of corresponding connectives are intersubstitutable. In particular:
• {p ∨1 q} 012 p ∨2 q;
• {p→1 q} 012 p→2 q;
• {¬2(p↔1 q)} 012 ¬2(p↔2 q);
• {¬2(p ∧1 q)} 012 ¬2(p ∧2 q);
• {p ∨1 ¬1q} 012 p ∨1 ¬2q.
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Therefore, `12 does not collapse.
Proof. We construct a coherent juxtaposed model to be a countermodel. Let










Let B1 be the Boolean structure corresponding to the first of these Boolean
algebras. Let B2 be the Boolean structure corresponding to the second Boolean
algebra. Let V (p1) = a, V (p2) = c, V (p3) = f, and V (p) = 1 for every other
p ∈ P12. Let the function [ ] be inductively defined as follows:
• [p] = V (p) if p ∈ P12;
• [¬iα] = −i[α];
• [α ∧i β] = [α] ui [β];
• [α ∨i β] = [α] ti [β];
• [α→i β] = −i[α] ti [β];
• [α↔i β] = (−i[α] ti [β]) ui (−i[β] ti [α]).
Here, −i, ui, and ti are the complement, infimum, and supremum relations on
the ith Boolean algebra.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Vi(α) = [α] if α is an i-atom. Let M12 = 〈B1, V1,B2, V2〉.
It is easy to show that M12 is a coherent bi-Boolean model. Thus, all of the
classical validities for each stock of connectives are designated in this model.
In M12, ‖α‖1 = ‖α‖2 = [α]. M12  ¬1α just in case [¬1α] = 1 just in case
[α] = 0 just in case [¬2α] = 1 just in case M12  ¬2α. M12  α ↔1 β just in
case [α ↔1 β] = 1 just in case [α] = [β] just in case [α ↔2 β] = 1 just in case
M12  α↔2 β.
In this model, ‖p1 ∨1 p3‖i = 1 and ‖p1 ∨2 p3‖i = a. ‖p3 →1 p2‖i = 1 and
‖p3 →2 p2‖i = c. ‖¬2(p1 ↔1 p3)‖i = −20 = 1 and ‖¬2(p1 ↔1 p3)‖i = −2f = c.
‖¬2(p1 ∧1 p3)‖i = −20 = 1 and ‖¬2(p1 ∧1 p3)‖i = −2f = c. ‖p1 ∨1 ¬1p1‖i = 1
and ‖p1 ∨1 ¬2p1‖i = a. 
Thus, if we enrich `cc (or a weaker logic) with the rules that say that ¬1 and ¬2
are intersubstitutable as main connectives and↔1 and↔2 are intersubstitutable
as main connectives, the resulting logic does not collapse.
Notice that if we enrich `ii (or a stronger logic) with the rules that says that
↔1 and↔2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives, the resulting logic is left-
extensional. (This is because {q ↔i r} is a regular equivalence set over Ci for `ii.
So if we enrich `ii with the rules that says that↔1 and↔2 are intersubstitutable
as main connectives, the resulting consequence relation is regularly equivalential
(simpliciter). By Proposition 6.36, any regularly equivalential consequence rela-
tion is left-extensional.) Thus, it follows from Proposition 7.5 that if we enrich
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`cc (or a weaker logic) with left-extensionality, the resulting consequence relation
does not collapse.
7.4. Weak Collapse. It is worth briefly considering a weaker kind of col-
lapse. Let f be the bijection from Sent(C1, P12) to Sent(C2, P12) that maps each
sentence α ∈ Sent(C1, P12) to the sentence that results from uniformly substi-
tuting each connective in α with the corresponding connective from C2. We
say that a consequence relation, `12, for Sent(C12, P12) weakly collapses just in
case for every Γ ⊆ Sent(C1, P12) and α ∈ Sent(C1, P12), Γ `12 α just in case
f(Γ) `12 f(α).
It is immediate that `cc and `ii weakly collapse. If `12 collapses then `12
weakly collapses. So by Proposition 7.3, if we enrich `ic with the rules that say
that →1 and →2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives, the resulting logic
weakly collapses.
Since `ic is a strong conservative extension over both intuitionist and classical
logic, `ic does not weakly collapse. Moreover, if we enrich `ic with the rules
that say that ¬1 and ¬2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives and ↔1 and
↔2 are intersubstitutable as main connectives, the resulting logic still does not
weakly collapse:
Proposition 7.6. Suppose `12 is the least consequence relation that extends
`ic such that for any α, β ∈ Sent(C12, P12), (i) {¬1α} `12 ¬2α and {¬2α} `12
¬1α; and (ii) {α↔1 β} `12 α↔2 β and {α↔2 β} `12 α↔1 β. Then `12 does
not weakly collapse.
Proof. Let B be a countably infinite set. Let 0 and 1 be elements of B. Let
B1 be a Heyting structure that is not also a Boolean structure with carrier set B
and with least element 0 and greatest element 1. Let B2 be a Boolean structure
with carrier set B and with least element 0 and greatest element 1.
Let ui, ti, and ⇒i be the infimum, supremum, and implication relations on
the ith algebra. Let a be an element of B such that a t1 (a ⇒1 0) 6= 1. Such
an element is guaranteed to exist since B1 is not a Boolean structure. Let V be
a function from P12 to B such that V (p
1) = a. Let the function [ ] be defined
inductively as follows:
• [p] = V (p) if p ∈ P12;
• [¬iα] = [α]⇒i 0;
• [α ∧i β] = [α] ui [β];
• [α ∨i β] = [α] ti [β];
• [α→i β] = [α]⇒i [β];
• [α↔i β] = ([α]⇒i [β]) ui ([β]⇒i [α]).
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Vi(α) = [α] if α is an i-atom. LetM12 = 〈B1, V1,B2, V2〉. It
is easy to show thatM12 is a coherent Heyting-Boolean model. Thus, all of the
intuitionist validities are designated for the first stock of connectives and all of
the classical validities are designated for the second. InM12, ‖α‖1 = ‖α‖2 = [α].
M12  ¬1α just in case [¬1α] = 1 just in case [α] = 0 just in case [¬2α] = 1
just in case M12  ¬2α. M12  α ↔1 β just in case [α ↔1 β] = 1 just in case
[α] = [β] just in case [α↔2 β] = 1 just in case M12  α↔2 β.
In this model, ‖p1 ∨1 ¬1p1‖i 6= 1 and ‖p1 ∨2 ¬2p1‖i = 1. Therefore `12 does
not weakly collapse. 
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It follows from this result that if we enrich `ic with left-extensionality, the
resulting consequence relation does not weakly collapse.
Taken together, our collapse and non-collapse results are somewhat surprising.
They show that the issue of when a logic collapses (or weakly collapses) is very
delicate. A full catalogue of such results must await another occasion.
7.5. Meta-Rules. There is a final topic worth discussing – namely, the status
of the familiar classical and intuitionist meta-rules. Here is a list of standard
natural deduction meta-rules:
Conditional Introduction. If Γ ∪ {α} ` β then Γ ` α→ β;
Biconditional Introduction. If Γ∪{α} ` β and Γ∪{β} ` α then Γ ` α↔
β;
Reasoning by Cases. If Γ ∪ {α} ` δ and Γ ∪ {β} ` δ then Γ ∪ {α ∨ β} ` δ;
Intuitionist Reductio. If Γ ∪ {α} ` β and Γ ∪ {α} ` ¬β then Γ ` ¬α;
Classical Reductio. If Γ ∪ {¬α} ` β and Γ ∪ {¬α} ` ¬β then Γ ` α.
Given our results, it is easy to show that if we enrich `ii (or a stronger logic)
with Conditional Introduction for both of →1 and →2, the resulting logic col-
lapses:
Proposition 7.7. Let `12 be a consequence relation for Sent(C12, P12) that
extends `ii and obeys Conditional Introduction for both conditionals. Then `12
collapses.50
Proof. {α, α →1 β} `ii β. By Conditional Introduction for →2, {α →1
β} `12 α →2 β. Similarly, {α →2 β} `12 α →1 β. By Proposition 7.3, `12
collapses. 
This result has an important consequence. We know that `cc, `ii, and `ic
do not collapse. So none of these consequence relations obey Conditional In-
troduction for both conditionals. (Indeed, they do not not obey Conditional
Introduction for either conditional.) Although juxtaposition preserves entail-
ments, it does not preserve the validity of meta-rules.51 What this shows is
that the meta-rules are in an important sense stronger than the corresponding
entailments that they license.
The standard meta-rules are closely related to one another:
Proposition 7.8. Suppose ` is a consequence relation that extends the in-
tuitionist consequence relation (in a perhaps larger language). Suppose ` obeys
Conditional Introduction. Then:
1. ` obeys Biconditional Introduction, Reasoning by Cases, and Intuitionist
Reductio;
2. If ` extends the classical consequence relation, then ` obeys Classical Re-
ductio.
Proof. Biconditional Introduction: Suppose Γ∪{α} ` β and Γ∪{β} ` α. By
Conditional Introduction, Γ ` α→ β and Γ ` β → α. {α→ β, β → α} ` α↔ β.
By Cut, Γ ` α↔ β.
50See Harris (1982) for a different proof of this result.
51See Coniglio (2007) for a variant of fibring designed to preserve meta-rules.
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Reasoning by Cases: Suppose Γ ∪ {α} ` δ and Γ ∪ {β} ` δ. By Conditional
Introduction, Γ ` α → δ and Γ ` β → δ. {α → δ, β → δ, α ∨ β} ` δ. By Cut,
Γ ∪ {α ∨ β} ` δ.
Intuitionist Reductio: Suppose Γ∪{α} ` β and Γ∪{α} ` ¬β. By Conditional
Introduction, Γ ` α → β and Γ ` α → ¬β. {α → β, α → ¬β} ` ¬α. By Cut,
Γ ` ¬α.
Classical Reductio: Suppose Γ∪{¬α} ` β and Γ∪{¬α} ` ¬β. By Conditional
Introduction, Γ ` ¬α→ β and Γ ` ¬α→ ¬β. In classical logic, {¬α→ β,¬α→
¬β} ` α. By Cut, Γ ` ¬α. 
More importantly for our purposes here, we also have the following relations:
Proposition 7.9. Suppose ` is a consequence relation that extends the in-
tuitionist consequence relation (in a perhaps larger language). Then:
1. If ` obeys Biconditional Introduction or Classical Reductio, then ` obeys
Conditional Introduction;
2. If ` extends the classical consequence relation and ` obeys Reasoning by
Cases or Intuitionist Reductio, then ` obeys Conditional Introduction.
Proof. Biconditional Introduction: Suppose Γ ∪ {α} ` β. {α, β} ` α ∧ β.
By Cut, Γ ∪ {α} ` α ∧ β. Γ ∪ {α ∧ β} ` α. By Biconditional Introduction,
Γ ` α↔ (α ∧ β). {α↔ (α ∧ β)} ` α→ β. By Cut, Γ ` α→ β.
Classical Reductio: We first show that if ` obeys Classical Reductio, then
` extends classical logic. {¬¬α,¬α} ` ¬α. {¬¬α,¬α} ` ¬¬α. By Classical
Reductio, {¬¬α} ` α. Thus, ` extends classical logic. We next show that
` obeys Conditional Introduction. Suppose Γ ∪ {α} ` β. In classical logic,
Γ∪{¬(α→ β)} ` α. By Cut, Γ∪{¬(α→ β)} ` β. In classical logic, Γ∪{¬(α→
β)} ` ¬β. By Classical Reductio, Γ ` α→ β.
Reasoning by Cases: Suppose Γ ∪ {α} ` β. {β} ` α → β. By Cut, Γ ∪
{α} ` α → β. In classical logic, Γ ∪ {¬α} ` α → β. By Reasoning by Cases,
Γ ∪ {α ∨ ¬α} ` α→ β. In classical logic, ` α ∨ ¬α. By Cut, Γ ` α→ β.
Intuitionist Reductio: Suppose Γ∪{α} ` β. In classical logic, Γ∪{¬(α→ β)} `
α. By Cut, Γ ∪ {¬(α → β)} ` β. In classical logic, Γ ∪ {¬(α → β)} ` ¬β. By
Intuitionist Reductio, Γ ` ¬¬(α→ β). In classical logic, {¬¬(α→ β)} ` α→ β.
By Cut, Γ ` α→ β. 
It follows that if we enrich `ii (or a stronger logic) with two copies of Bicondi-
tional Introduction or with two copies of Classical Reductio, the resulting logic
collapses. If we enrich `cc (or a stronger logic) with two copies of Reasoning by
Cases or two copies of Intuitionist Reductio, the resulting logic collapses.52
There is another meta-rule worth discussing. Recall the definition of Entail-
ment Congruence:
Entailment Congruence. If Γ ∪ {α} ` β and Γ ∪ {β} ` α then for any
δ ∈ Sent(C,P ) and p occurring in δ, Γ ∪ {δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p].
This meta-rule is not an introduction or elimination rule. It does not govern
the behavior of any particular connective. Roughly speaking, it governs how
52See McGee (2000) for a proof of the claim that if `12 is a consequence relation for
Sent(C12, P12) that obeys the usual natural deduction rules for intuitionist logic for each stock
of connectives, then `12 collapses.
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logical equivalents behave within embeddings. It is perhaps better thought of as
something like a structural rule.
We can prove the following result:
Proposition 7.10. Suppose ` is a consequence relation that extends the
intuitionist consequence relation (in a perhaps larger language). Then ` obeys
Entailment Congruence just in case ` obeys Conditional Introduction.
Proof. Suppose Γ∪ {α} ` β and Γ∪ {β} ` α. By Conditional Introduction,
Γ ` α → β and Γ ` β → α. {α → β, β → α, δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p]. By Cut,
Γ ∪ {δ[α/p]} ` δ[β/p].
Now suppose Γ ∪ {α} ` β. {α, β} ` α ∧ β. By Cut, Γ ∪ {α} ` α ∧ β.
Γ ∪ {α ∧ β} ` α. By Entailment Congruence, Γ ∪ {α → α} ` α → (α ∧ β).
` α→ α. {α→ (α ∧ β)} ` α→ β. By Cut, Γ ` α→ β. 
It follows that `cc, `ii, and `ic do not obey Entailment Congruence. It also
follows that juxtaposition does not preserve Entailment Congruence.53 Finally,
it follows that if `ii (or a stronger logic) is enriched with Entailment Congruence,
the resulting logic collapses.
§8. Discussion. Let us return to the issues that this paper started with:
What should we make of the appeal to collapse arguments in motivating philo-
sophical theses? Should we conclude that the logical constants in our language
have determinate extensions? Should we conclude that disputes in ontology are
genuine disputes? Should we conclude that either intuitionism is correct and
classical logic is incoherent or classical logic is correct and the intuitionists fail
to recognize genuinely valid entailments?
One of the morals of this paper is that the answers to these questions are not
very clear. What has emerged from the discussion above is that the success of
collapse arguments, perhaps surprisingly, depends on the status of the meta-rules
– including the standard natural deduction rules as well as Entailment Congru-
ence. If we endorse classical logic (say), should we accept only the classically
valid theorems and entailments or should we also accept the classical meta-rules?
If we are working in a language with only the familiar logical constants, there
is no way to accept the classically valid theorems and entailments without also
accepting the meta-rules. But the difference looms large when we expand our
language with additional vocabulary, for instance by adding a second stock of
logical constants. The crux of the matter, then, seems to be this: When we
expand our language, should we endorse the meta-rules as applying to the ex-
panded language? If the answer is no, the collapse arguments are not worth very
much. If the answer is yes, the collapse arguments are difficult to resist.54
This issue is bound up with deep issues concerning the nature of logic. On
one picture of the nature of logic, logic is intimately tied to reasoning. Logic
is a theory of good reasoning: It captures how we ought to reason deductively.
This conception of logic fits very naturally with the claim that the standard
natural deduction rules are of central importance. Such rules tell us how we
53Algebraic fibring does not preserve Entailment Congruence, either. For an example, see
Zanardo et al. (2001), page 434.
54We might give different answers to different proposed appeals to collapse arguments.
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ought to reason.55 We should hold on to such rules no matter how we expand
our language.56
On an alternative picture of the nature of logic, logic is not normative but
descriptive. Logic is the theory of the logical consequence relation. It is the
theory of what follows from what.57 This conception of logic fits very naturally
with the claim that what is central to logic is not the natural deduction rules
but the logical truths and entailment claims. We need not hold on to the meta-
rules as we expand our language. The role of the meta-rules is simply to encode
entailments in a user-friendly way.58
What we should conclude about the use of collapse arguments in arguing for
philosophically striking theses thus depends on how we should conceive of the
nature of logic. This a difficult and central issue in the philosophy of logic.
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